This paper addresses two challenges to the Theory of Recollection in Phaedo. First, it raises the concern of comparative perception, which claims that a newborn infant must possess the ability to comparatively perceive the object in order for the process of recollection to work, and proposes a limited solution for the concern. Second, it examines the compatibility between the two seemingly contradictory claims concerning the role of sense perception in acquiring true knowledge in Phaedo, in which Socrates claims both that we can never acquire true knowledge by relying on our physical senses, and that the only way for us to retrieve Forms is through our sense-‐perception. How can we make sense of this argument? I further propose two possible solutions to the second challenge, based on my interpretation of Timaeus and Republic V.
"On Sense Perception and Theory of Recollection in Phaedo,"
Acta Cogitata: A Philosophy Journal: Vol. 3
, Article 1.
Available at: http://commons.emich.edu/ac/vol3/iss1/1