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# Ottoman Empire's Role in the Emergence of the "European" World System

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OTTOMAN EMPIRE'S ROLE IN THE EMERGENCE OF THE "EUROPEAN" WORLD  
SYSTEM

by

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Thesis

Submitted to the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology

Eastern Michigan University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

Sociology

Thesis Committee:

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Ypsilanti, Michigan

## DEDICATION

To my Mom and Dad and all of my nine brothers and five sisters.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to acknowledge my thanks to my professor Jay Weinstein: your help and support were the driving force for me to finish this project. I would also like to thank everybody who came to my presentation and who watched it on youtube.

## ABSTRACT

In this study I will be focusing on classical world system theory. I will discuss the revisions that are done to the system and how these revisions opened up possibilities to include the Ottoman Empire in the world system. The categories that were created by Immanuel Wallerstein to depict the world system, such as core, semi-periphery, periphery countries, and hegemonic states, suggest that a major actor in the system is left out. I will present historical facts showing how the Ottoman Empire and the Europeans were in a constant interaction. This interaction took place in different forms that were important in the emergence of *the modern world system*, but they were not discussed in the Wallersteinian model. I aim to place the Ottoman Empire in its proper position in the world system to present a better understanding of it.

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## CHAPTER 1: THE OTTOMANS IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

### A. Introduction

My thesis topic is world system theory. My interest in this subject developed out of the papers that I wrote on globalization. There is a one-world system consisting of different interdependent parts. When I read “The End of the World as We Know It,” which is one of Immanuel Wallerstein’s major works, I was fascinated by his interpretation of historical events and his account of the formation of new states and how they created favorable situations to control territories beyond their borders. His interpretation of the Cold War and how it shaped international relations increased my interest to learn more about the world system theory. Wallerstein (1999:14, 16) stated that after the Second World War, the United States and the USSR reached the Yalta Agreement. According to a spoken agreement at Yalta, Americans and Soviets divided the world into two parts: east of the Elbe River was controlled by the Soviets and the west of the Elbe was given to the United States. The two superpowers agreed that there were not going to be any nuclear wars between them. Both the United States and the Soviet Union could propagate their own ideology in the other’s zone, but they could not change the regime of any states that were not included in their zones. As a result, there was a polarization of world systems in which all nations took part. In order to illustrate this situation better, I want to give an example from my home country. In Turkey we had two major political groups, the leftists and the rights, who aligned with the Soviets and the Americans respectively. The leftists were committed to the Communist Ideology, which was represented by the Soviets, while the rightists were in favor of Liberalism, which was represented by the United States of America. The division between these two groups disseminated into all stratum of the Turkish society in early 1980’s and it

got to the point where people started to kill each other in the defense of these two ideologies. Furthermore, the Turkish Army interrupted the democratic process in Turkey three times as a result of the turmoil created by different factions in Turkish society. These factions came into being as a direct result of the political and cultural atmosphere created by polarization of the world in which each nation felt the necessity to belong to either the American World or to the Soviet World. The propaganda by the Soviets and Americans to preserve the world system was so strong that, starting in the 1960s and lasting until the end of 1980s, there was a strong belief among the Turkish people that there was going to be a war between the USSR and the USA. However, this war, seemingly imminent to many around the world, was never going to take place.

During my graduate studies at Eastern Michigan University, I took some courses in which I was further exposed to the world system theory. At this time, I focused more on the emergence of the system to understand its current status and the changes that it is undergoing. The world system is presented as one encompassing whole; the advocates of the world system theory consider the European powers to be the center of mass, with the remaining states orbiting them. However, the Ottoman Empire was equally strong in some key aspects, such as militarily, economically and politically, as the European powers. Therefore, the world system theory is not going to live up to its legacy when it does not include the Ottomans. I chose to focus on Ottoman World, which was an independent political entity constantly interacting with the European World. The Ottomans were in constant relationships from their beginning until their collapse with the European World in various arenas. I argue that any world system theory that relies on the development of



European economic and political system will be incomplete as long as it excludes the Ottomans' role in the development of such a system.

## B. Literature Review

The world system analysis is a neo-Marxist global change theory developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s. It focuses on social and economic inequalities among states composing the system. Accordingly the world system, perspective is based on the assumption that there is one single economy in the world, which emerged at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, and each state plays a different role in this system. Therefore, world system is stratified. Wallerstein (1975) writes,

I would like to designate this point of view 'the world-system perspective'. The term 'the world-system perspective' is based on the assumption that, explicitly or implicitly, that the modern world comprises a single capitalist world-economy, which has emerged historically since the sixteenth century and which still exists today. It follows from such a premise that national states are not societies that have separate, parallel histories, but are parts of a whole reflecting that whole. To the extent that stages exist, they exist for the system as a whole. To be sure, since different parts of the world play and have played differing roles in the capitalist world economy, they have dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive politics. (p. 16)

As it can be seen from the above statements, the development of capitalism is played a central role in the emergence of world system, which emerged in Europe at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The main assumption of world system analysis is that there is one expanding

world economy while there are several expanding states having relations with each other, according to a capital-labor relationship. As the world economy expands, the differentiation between states becomes more apparent. On one hand, there are economically more advanced “core” countries and, on the other hand, there are less advanced “periphery” countries (Munch 1994:95).

The accumulation of capital is one of the most important pillars of the emergence of the system. The second most important pillar is the colonization of continental America and Africa directly and of Asia more way. According to Wallerstein (1980:97), capitalism came into existence in Western Europe around 1600 and gained ground to be a matchless system, starting to dominate the other parts of the world by the end of 1750. The main reason that capitalism sustained and flourished during this time period was because of the eradication of the feudal system in Europe. Once the era of feudalism ended in Europe, new states emerged that dominated the region and colonized other parts of the world. Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) designates these new states as hegemonic powers and defines hegemony as “... a situation wherein the products of a given core state are produced so efficiently that they are by and large competitive even in other core states, and therefore the given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world market (p. 38)” The hegemonic situation does not create totalitarianism because the interstate system is based on the equal balance of multi-core-like powers. In this perspective, the system has seen three hegemonic powers: the United Provinces, 1620-1672; the United Kingdom, 1815-1873; the United States 1945-1967 (Wallerstein 1984:40). Moreover, Wallerstein (1980) argues that the basic criterion for hegemonic powers is a combination of a strong economy and military, and once a hegemonic state reaches its utmost power, it begins to decline, giving way to another hegemonic state.

The hegemonic status is consolidated by the establishment of an ideology and the World Wars taking place at the time. In the former case, the global “liberalism” was supported to ensure free trade and the existence of overseas colonies. In the latter case, the first period of hegemony was granted by the Thirty Years’ War of 1618 to 1648, the hegemonic period of Great Britain was secured with the Napoleonic Wars of 1792 to 1815, and the American hegemony emerged after the long Eurasian Wars, from 1914 to 1945 (Wallerstein, 1984).

The world system is composed of three different regions: the core, the semi-periphery and periphery. The core is populated by countries that have hegemony over the rest of the countries that make up the system. The core shifts from one country to another.

In this project, I want to look at the emergence of the world system, namely the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. I seek to examine the extent to which the Ottomans were another system in relationship with the current world system. The European World and the Ottomans were in constant struggle to hold each other in check and to be the sole power in the world. In addition to these, China was another strong state that was also in contact with the Ottoman World and Europe, especially through Silk Road. Wallersteinian world system analysis is very Eurocentric and does not include the Ottomans as an active player in the system. Although Wallerstein marks the beginning of the world system as 1492, he does not cover the full picture of the series of events taking place in the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and India. Andrew C. Hess (1973) argues that the Portuguese once emerged as one of the strongest naval powers in Western Europe before the turn of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, wanting to replace the Venetians as the sole distributor of Eastern goods, and unionized the Christians of the East to attack the Muslim World. For that purpose they assaulted Mamluks, which was a state located in the Fertile Crescent, with Cairo as the capital city, but were

never able to conquer it. Mamluks were on a trade route between China and India on the one side and Europe on the other.

There are some other scholars who also believe that limiting the world system to the Western World would be insufficient to explain the diverse cultural experience of human beings. Andrea G. Frank and Barry K. Gills (1993:11-12) argue that all parts of the world are related to each other and that World history should be capable of covering all components; thus, Western civilization alone cannot explain this big picture. Nevertheless, the Western possession of mass media and the globalization of the world serve as great tools for the Western World to present the historical phenomena in their favor.

When Constantinople was captured by the Ottomans and turned into Istanbul, the Turkish State became embedded in relationships between Europe and the East, namely China and India. From 1453 until 1579, the Ottomans developed in trade, science, and military, causing its civilization to hit its peak. During this era and until the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottomans controlled half of Europe with intense contact with France, the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and some other major states in Western Europe. Hess (1973:62) states, “In 1453 the Ottomans had, among other things, decided to become a naval power. Mediterranean ships would be a major means by which the Ottomans would project their operations over great distances.”

In the east, the Ottomans’ territory extended to the Red Sea. In the south it had all of North Africa, and in the it had north some parts of Russia and Ukraine. The major seas, such as the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Red Sea were controlled by the Ottomans. This indicates that the Ottomans were dominant actors in trading and the accumulation of capital from these routes.

I believe that we cannot place the Ottomans either in the semi-periphery or periphery category in the world system analysis. Without giving Ottomans their proper role in world system analysis, the system will be incomplete and Eurocentric.

In the following pages I will demonstrate that the Ottomans developed different sciences, such as astronomy, navigation, optics, medicine, and others, during the era when Istanbul was the capital of scholars. The migration of different scholars from other parts of the world to Istanbul made the city the center of science. The translation of Greek texts into Latin in Istanbul helped the Europeans to experience the Renaissance. In turn, the Renaissance triggered the Industrial Revolution, which helped the shifting of the core from the Ottomans to the United Provinces and then to the United Kingdom.

Consequently, there would not be the modern world system if it were not for the Ottomans. A theory that is going to bypass the role of the Ottomans in the emergence of the world system will remain Eurocentric. If the world system theory does not cover the huge Ottoman geography of three continents belonging to a world power, it cannot be a “world system” theory.

The Ottoman state was established by a small band of nomads coming from Central Asia at the turn of the 15th century. This Turkoman band was a tribe under Osman, and it settled in the area of Bithynia, near Nicaea (Goffman 2002). During this time, Near Asia (Anatolia) was divided by many Turkic small states that were called “beylik”, that were in a constant conflict. Additionally, Anatolia served as a buffer zone between Europe and Asia while curbing Mongolians raids aimed at the destruction of land, civilization, and people. Cippola (1965) depicts a similar picture of Europe in that time, arguing that Europeans were divided and engaged in long wars with each other. Their heavy cavalry, which was the main

force, was very vulnerable to the light eastern cavalry. Moreover, he says: “For one reason or another, throughout the Middle Ages, Europe’s main hope of survival continued to be placed in the large measure in the hands of God (Cipolla 1965:17).” For instance, Europe was saved from the Mongol’s threat when Timur Leuk was engaged with Bayazed, who curbed a possible attack to Europe. At the same time, Europe was safe from a Turkish advancement since the Ottoman military force was crashed and the Ottoman state was plunged into disorder for coming decades.

There are many theories reflecting upon the advancement of Ottomans into the European landscape until 1699, when the Ottomans were stopped and held in check for the first time. First of all, they took a different approach in expanding their nascent state than did other Turkomans in Anatolia, by engaging mainly with Europeans rather than other Turkish and Muslim states in the east. Their geographical position, as well as Byzantium vulnerability, gave them an opportunity to cross over to Europe. Secondly, the Ottomans justified their incursion into the European landscape by an ideology in which they presented themselves as representatives of Islam fighting infidels. Goffman (2002) states,

The third of these hypotheses (popularly known as ‘the gazi thesis’) has proven the most durable and accepted. This thesis states that the early Ottomans and other western-Anatolian Turkomans had converted to Islam at some time during their migration across Central Asia, Persia, and Anatolia and had become dedicated, even fanatical, warriors on behalf of gaza (holy war). (p. 33)

The Ottomans did not engage in wars with other Turkish states but, rather, with Europeans, in order to create sympathy among inhabitants of Anatolia, which functioned as a source of manpower to them. Besides this, the soldiers displaced in Anatolia and Central Asia as a

result of Mongolian raids joined the Ottomans, strengthening their military might. Thirdly, the Ottomans were resilient in adjusting themselves to the current geo-political situation in western Anatolia by establishing alliances with Byzantium and against Latin states since they lacked a navy in this early time. Another form of alliance with Byzantium came in the form of marriage to the royal family of Byzantium: For example, Orhan II married into the Contacuzenus family to seal the pact of alliance between the two states (Goffman 2002).

As the Ottoman state established itself in Europe, it came in contact with Venice, which was a strong sea power engaged in Mediterranean trade as the main distributor of spices and other imports to Western Europe. When Istanbul was captured by Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Venice sent an emissary to the capital to build up an agreement to regulate trade in Mediterranean and in Istanbul itself (Goffman 2002). While Venice was establishing a good relationship with the Ottomans on the one hand, on the other hand it was in conflict with the Pope, Spain, and France. Moreover, the Venetians took the Church of Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem as a point of reference, which brought this European state closer to the Eastern world than to European (Faroqhi 1995).

Besides being active at the interstate level, the Ottoman State functioned as regulatory body politics by creating good conditions for its citizens doing international trade. For that purpose, they encouraged non-Muslim subjects to continue business by creating specific courts that dealt with the issues of minorities. We know that most Muslims were pastoralists, and Armenians were specialized in international trade, mainly trading in precious stones and silks. Greeks were good marines, and Jews were in the textile industry (Goffman 2002). The Ottomans regulated a trading relationship with Venetians doing business on their territory by 'ahidname', which is also known as capitulations (Faroqhi 1995). When the Ottomans

expanded in the East, they followed the same policy toward merchants in their province. In the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, the central authority in Istanbul rebuked the ruler of Mecca by saying that Indian merchants had stopped coming to Jiddah in large numbers because they were not treated properly. In an official letter, it was suggested that those merchants must be provided with the justice they needed in order to do business or they would not continue to do business in this part of the Empire (Faroqhi 1995). The Ottomans rulers granted Venetians and other non-Ottoman merchants' rights to live in the country and to do business as long as they wanted. The Venetian prevalence in the Ottoman state was consolidated by the creation of 'bailos', the consuls who settled the disputes among the Venetian merchants. The native local courts were not authorized to intervene in these disputes, but an unresolved case could be brought to the capital city to be reviewed. Faroqhi (1995) informs us that despite the common belief that Venetians mainly did business in Egypt and Syria, they developed a business community in Izmir, often trading with Christians and Jews established there. It is not surprising that a significant number of Jewish people continue to reside in this third-largest city in today's Turkey. These Venetian merchants were bringing woolen cloth and glassware while purchasing raw cotton, wax, and leather. With the start of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Venetian merchants carried their goods by English ships to avoid paying *cotimo* and *bailaggio* to the Venetian consuls (Faroqhi 1995).

The trade in the Mediterranean basin between the Ottomans and Venetians brought the Western world and the Eastern world into intense interaction. The relationships between states involved in trade in this major sea were sometimes regulated by treaties. Other times the conflicts between them were solved by wars. The Europeans learned about the spices, gold, and other trading goods when they did business in the area sometimes called Levantine.



The trade here did not come to halt even when the Americas were discovered by Europeans. For instance, the first British settlers in Jamestown were mainly men coming to get rich quickly by pillaging and trading; they then planned to return home. Even in this time, they still perceived North Africa as richer in gold than America (Matar 1999).

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the interactions between the Ottomans and the English were brought to a new level as these two major powers came into closer contact. The relationship occurred in the forms of diplomacy, trade in the Mediterranean, travel, exchange of prisoners, and even marriages. For example, in 1597, Sultan Murad III sent an envoy to the Queen, offering her unrestricted trade between two countries. This Turkish man brought with him special presents from the sultan, like horses, lions, and exotic goods. The two rulers reached an agreement that guaranteed safe trade in two countries for each side. This treaty secured a military and a popular market vis-à-vis Spain for England (Matar 1999).

The Ottomans were seen by England as a major power in an interstate system since they were dominating the Mediterranean trade and had a powerful military. When Charles I followed the example of Queen Elizabeth by signing different treaties in the 1630s to enlarge trade with the Turks and Moors, the Dutch felt threatened and feared losing their privileges with England. These treaties allowed the Turks and Moors to sell and buy goods in England and to use Welsh and English harbors (Matar 1999).

### C. Purpose of Study

In this project, my aim is to illustrate that World System Theory has limitations and that it is incomplete. I will attempt to show that the Ottoman World played a positive role in the formation of the world system. Furthermore, I aim to demonstrate that the role that the

Ottoman Empire, which had core-like characteristics, played in the formation of the world system is understated. Accordingly, if we do not acknowledge this fact, then the system would be incomplete.

#### D. Justification and Significance

According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1999:35), the world system, which is a capitalist world economy, came into existence in the course of the sixteenth century in Europe. The system tended to expand throughout the whole globe by incorporating all parts of the world. Nevertheless, this capitalist world system could not incorporate the Ottoman World, at least for three centuries. In fact, the Ottoman Empire attempted to conquer Western Europe to incorporate it into its vast landscape, but it was too late because the new European system was strong enough to keep it advanced beyond Vienna (Wallerstein, 1999:128).

The Ottoman State was in constant active interaction with Western European states, and it was a hegemonic power in the Mediterranean, starting from the time of the Barbarossa's brothers until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In order to consolidate this hegemony, Suleiman the Magnificent allied with France against Spain, Venice, Genoa, and other European countries that were trying to dominate the Mediterranean waters (Bradford 1968:122). Therefore, if we talk about a world system that emerged in Europe without giving the Ottomans their proper role and function in the system, we will not have a holistic picture of the system.

The world system theory claims that a unique European capitalist system unified the world for the first time in history. Nevertheless, Amir (1993) argues that this statement distorts reality since different states were not isolated from each other before the emergence

of this capitalist system in the 16th century in Europe. In this study I also aim to indicate that the Ottoman World was another potent system that influenced the emergence of the world system. The Ottomans were in great rivalry with Europeans, playing a role of anti thesis. If we exclude the Ottomans from the world system, then we are going to have an incomplete picture.

#### E. Research Question

In this research I want to explore the following issues:

- The extent to which the Ottoman World can be separated from the world system as Wallerstein views it.
- The extent to which the world system theory, which classifies nations as core, periphery, and semi-periphery states, can explain the Ottoman Empire's position in the world system.
- The possibility of the emergence of the world system if there had been no Ottoman State.
- The extent to which interactions and relationships existed between the Ottoman World and the European World and the way they contributed to the formation of the current modern world system.

#### F. Methodology

My research design is that of comparative historical method, since I am studying the patterns of interactions and relationships between the European World and the Ottoman World during the formation of world systems from the 15<sup>th</sup> century to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. It is

important to make the distinction between sociology and history since the subject matter of the former is mainly focused on the types of events and things, while the subject matter of the latter is focused on a particular time, culture, or aspect of social life (Semelser 1968). Early sociologists, such as Spencer and Comte, also relied on history while trying to generate ‘the laws of society’, although they confined their reliance to events that filled their theoretical frameworks (Mouzelis 1994:32). Contemporary sociologists, on the other hand, are using historical materials to formulate cogent new theories that explain historical patterns and structures (Bonnell 1980).

It is important to indicate that historical sociologists create theoretical apparatus and conceptual frameworks mediating with historical empirical materials. Neil J. Smelser says that “historical problems have tended to be rooted in specific empirical contexts, and sociological problems have tended to be generated from conceptual frameworks, though this generalization does not apply unequivocally to either discipline” (p.37). Accordingly, Skocpol (1987:24) argues that historical sociologists do not disregard the big picture, while they use a variety of and the details of history and they are the scholars who taught us that the formations of national states are as important as urbanization and the capitalist development.

American sociologists started to employ the historical method thoroughly in their works in 1960 and 1970. The implication of this method was part of an effort to look at colonialism and developmentalism from a different perspective. Charles Tilly (1981:39) argues that the historical method best explained the destitution of poor countries since it was a result of the long, slow, historically endemic process of occupation, exploitation and control. Furthermore, Tilly believes that Immanuel Wallerstein’s work contributed a great deal of practice of sociology, since Wallerstein was able to present a synthesis between the

processes of capitalist world economy and Fernand Braudel's theoretical Mediterranean World, as well as how the two constitute one-single interdependent system.

My unit of analysis is going to be the European World System and the Ottoman World System. I want to explore the patterns of interactions between these two systems with the aim of examining the extent to which they intermingled as a result of geographical proximity and constant interaction.

## CHAPTER 2: CLASSICAL WORLD SYSTEM THEORY

### A. Why the Classical World System Needs a Revision

In this chapter I will be focusing on the classical world system theory. Then I will elaborate on different paradigms that have emerged in an endeavor to understand this system. As my discussion proceeds, it will be ostensible that the classical world system theory needs to be revised in order to sustain its claim that all parts of this system are linked.

The categories that were created by Immanuel Wallerstein to depict the world system, such as core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries and hegemonic states, suggest that a major actor in the system is left out. This major actor is the Ottoman Empire, which was established at the turn of 14<sup>th</sup> century and was dissolved at the end of World War I. Sometimes as a rival of the core states and at other times as an ally of the core states of the world system, the Ottomans left a decisive mark on the development of this system.

As an inheritor of the Eastern Roman Empire, the Ottomans rose to the position of the world power at the heart of Europe, where the modern world system emerged. The crucial role that the Ottomans played in the emergence of the world system has not been studied thoroughly by the proponents of the world system although there was an attempt to place it in a periphery category. As a result, a Eurocentric world system theory, which is very partial in selecting the major political actors as major contributors to the development of the system, fails to present a more accurate picture of historical events that were vital in the course of the development of this global system, which eventually became the major discourse for Wallerstein and his followers. Zolberg (1981) points out this aspect of Wallerstein's theory by saying that

when considering from that vantage point, Wallerstein's characterization of the modern world system and the explanation he gives of its origins are not merely incomplete, but demonstrably wrong. The two flaws are inextricably related because, by minimizing the importance of one major feature of the system, he gives undue weight to the other, thereby distorting the whole account so much that it becomes inaccurate. (p. 255)

With this study, I aim to bring to the surface the neglected historical events that were linked to important developments in "the long sixteenth century," such as the rise of hegemonic powers, trade, and world markets in the world system, to present a better understanding of it.

According to Wallerstein, as mentioned above, the world system theory emerged in Europe at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. During this time period and in coming centuries, the Ottoman Empire played a very important role in the history of Europe and some other parts of the World in Asia and Africa that I will explain further in the coming chapters. However, the Ottoman Empire's participation in the world system politics and economics as one of the world powers of the time remained a mystery for Wallerstein and his followers.

Wallerstein's (1999) claim, or, should I say, confession, that the Ottoman world could be treated as another system is not good enough for reflecting its place in this world system, since this world was not enclosed within itself. Rather, the Ottoman world was part of the developments that were taking place in Europe, East Asia, and Africa, as a decisive major world power although it lost its position for various reasons during the 18<sup>th</sup> century, something from which it never recovered.

I think it is important to make a distinction between the early characteristics of the world system and its current features. To treat the modern world system as the same

throughout its lifespan led the proponents of the world system to the pitfall of giving the Dutch more credit than other major political powers, like the Ottomans, during the evolution of the modern world system. The name “world system” suggests that there is one universal system composed of different parts. In other words, each and every member of the world system has a specific role and a distinct place in the system. Moreover, one will accept a consistency of the world system theory across time and geography as far as its universal uniqueness goes. For example, it is essential to know whether the categories of the world system, such as core, semi-periphery and periphery, have been relevant from the time when the system emerged until now. Is the Wallersteinian world system capable of explaining the features and the roles of all nations in his system since the beginning of his system? Or are these categories only applicable in today’s world because of the emergence of the information age, circulation of capital, communication, transportation, Internet, mass media, technology and some other distinctive developments that are crucial elements in connecting all parts of the world but that are only peculiar to today’s world? It is not a secret that all parts of the world in its present state, are linked to each other, and the information about anything that happens somewhere in the world is disseminated even to a little village in far corners of the world. In line with this argument, I also agree that there is an international system made up of nation states, in which each nation could be assigned to the core, semi-periphery or periphery category although the semi-periphery category is not as distinct as the other two categories. However, I do not agree that all parts of the world were linked to each other during the hegemonic powers of the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in the same way as they are today.



The theoretical explanation of the world system leaves out some important developments taking place in Europe that were important in the emergence of the system despite the fact that Europe was chosen as a unit of analysis. For Wallerstein, only the specific historical events that are *always* associated with the European states are important in the rise of the system or in the demarcation of different phases of the world system, such as when one state ended in a position of hegemony. Nevertheless, he failed to give serious attention to some other equally important historical events that were taking place in Europe and outside Europe. For instance, Andalusia, which was a Muslim country in the heart of Europe like the Ottomans were, ruled in Spain for eight centuries but their presence in Europe and their contribution to the scientific development of Europe have been neglected by Wallerstein and other proponents of the world system theory. These Muslims translated astronomy, medicine, philosophy, and mathematics from original Syriac Greek texts to Latin, making it possible for the Europeans to learn these sciences (Wikipedia 2007). This non-European Muslim state was destroyed by the Spaniards in 1492. This is the date that Wallerstein marks as the beginning of the emergence of the world system, but he associates the date with the great discoveries made by the Europeans. Not surprisingly, there is no account of Andalusian civilization by Immanuel Wallerstein although many other European scholars, including Carlo M. Cipolla (1965), whom Wallerstein cites from on several occasions, believe that their presence in Spain was a great gift for the Europeans.

The presence of the Ottomans in Europe is the most important historical event in European history, which was left out of the theoretical framework of the Wallersteinian model although it played a positive role in the emergence of world system theory. The Ottomans were included in the system as a periphery country, but the evidence was drawn

from the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the Ottoman Empire no longer preserved its strong economic and militaristic character. The period between 1453 and 1699, when the Ottomans were in a core-status country and shaping the politics of the core countries of Europe in its favor, was not discussed by the world theoreticians at all. In the following chapters I aim to touch upon the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and how it played an important role in the emergence of the world system. Once I provide a full picture of how the Ottomans played this role, it will be clear that if it were not for the Ottomans, the world system probably could not have emerged in Europe as Wallerstein argues. Furthermore, it will be clearer that a theory that leaves the Ottomans out of the picture will remain Eurocentric and will not provide a true, full picture of the emergence of the capitalist world system.

The foray of the crusaders at the beginning of the last millennium was the milestone in the development of the historical events that formed the basis for the emergence of the modern world system. The crusaders made incursions into the Turko-Muslim World not only for religious purposes but also for the wealth in the East that they believed could exist only in fairy tales. Similarly, the raids from East to West in the Middle Ages and beyond were done by the Ottomans, and once they were settled in Europe, the Europeans' expedition to the East came to a halt until another way was found through the great discoveries. This trend suggests that there was always one general struggle, conflict, or interaction between the East and the West at the state level, going as far back as prehistorical times. This conflict took place in different forms, and it cannot be solely confined to religion or economy.

The movement of the Ottomans into Europe started with the conquest of Istanbul, and it stopped with their failure to take Vienna. The Ottoman presence in Europe lasted for

roughly six centuries. Starting from the 15<sup>th</sup> century and lasting until the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, they were a balancing power in Europe, and if it were not for the Ottomans' world system, the modern world system would not have come into being in Europe. I believe that it is important to provide a detailed theoretical background of the Wallersteinian model before I delve into discussion of the role the Ottomans played in the emergence of the modern world system. Moreover, it will be enlightening to illustrate how Marx interpreted capitalism since the world system theory is a neo-Marxist theory and capitalism and the modern world system are two sides of the same coin.

## B. Different Theories on the Emergence of Capitalism

When Immanuel Wallerstein started to write about capitalism in the 1970s, there were many scholars studying the modernization process, development, and underdevelopment. These modernization theorists believed that all nations could follow the same path from a traditional society to a modern one. In an attempt to break from this line of thought, Wallerstein saw capitalism as a world economic system, which is a specific historical event, but a universal one, emerging at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century in Europe (Skocpol 1977). Similarly, Marx expected capitalism to spread all over the world with the revolutionized instruments of production by the bourgeoisie, and he believed that this in turn would change the relations of production and eventually the whole relations of society (Brenner 1977). Accordingly, we can say that Marx believed in the universal characteristic of capitalism to be seen in all parts of the world in the near future although it was a historically specific event in a specific place. Thus, Paige (1999) says that “historical conditional theory, however, unlike conjectural or contingent explanation, does involve generalization beyond the individual

case, if not to all cases, and contributes to the development of conditional theoretical frameworks, not simply to the understanding of particular historic conjunctures” (p.785).

Marx’s interest was more in developing a general theory of social change. Specifically, he analyzed the transition from feudalism to capitalism that took place in Europe. To him this transition came about in two different ways: (1) The producer no longer produced for self-sustenance but for the market. (2) The mercantile activity and the number of trading centers increased in Europe. The existence of a propertyless “wage-labor” force was a pre-condition for these two processes, and this wage-labor itself was a direct result of the increase of mercantile activity and the growth of towns and trade in Europe. Based on this framework, the central debate on this issue was focused on whether this was a “sociogeographical” phenomenon or whether it could be applied to all places at all times. Although both feudalism and capitalism came into existence in Europe, only the latter spread throughout the other parts of the world to a certain extent (Holton 1981:837).

Why didn't capitalism, as an economic and social system, develop in the non-European world as much as it developed in Europe? Was it because feudalism did not exist there? I think it is important that we take into account the fact that the emergence of capitalism in Europe corresponds with the beginning stages of colonization, whereby the Western European countries became involved in the overseas trade that mainly took place in the form of expropriation of the natural resources of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thus, the emergence of towns and industrial capitalist classes in Western Europe was directly related to the “colonization” of the other parts of the world. This aspect of the development of capitalism was incipient at the time when Marx was developing his theory of “historical materialism.” As a result, we don’t have an extensive firsthand Marxist literature on

colonialism and the role it played in the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe. On the contrary, Marx provided enough accounts of the beginning stages of the development of capitalism in Western Europe, particularly in England, explaining it with a transition from feudalism to capitalism and the dynamics that laid the ground for this transition.

Marx's social change theory is a progressive one, and it assumes linearity in the development of social, economic, and political formations in human history. I believe that the main drawback of Marxist theory comes from the fact that Marx mainly relied on European history and he did not utilize the history of the non-European part of the world to the extent that it could have provided him with a different picture of the experience of humankind. We cannot argue that we would have a more holistic Marxist social change theory if Marx had studied social relations of production and class struggles in other societies besides the European societies. I think that people's understanding of human relationships is influenced by the society they are a part of and the by time that they live in although this influence could vary from person to person.

As I mentioned above, it is important to present a full Marxist perspective on the development of capitalism since both modernization and world system theory are deriving their theoretical framework from this perspective. DuPlessis (1988) writes,

The concerns, concepts and interpretations of world system theory are all informed by the Marxist debate over the transition from feudalism to capitalism: from an essentially agrarian and subsistence economy in which the dominant noble class used political means (force or the threat of force) to obtain the economic resources required to perpetuate its position, to one oriented to the production of commodities

for exchange under the tutelage of entrepreneurs who rely on economic (chiefly market) mechanisms to produce their hegemony. (p. 223)

Marx wrote extensively on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe. To him, the first prerequisite of the emergence of capitalism was the emancipation of peasant proprietors from the feudal lords in the 14<sup>th</sup> century because this triggered unfettered commodity production, which was exploited by the capitalists. The second prerequisite was that the producers no longer produced for self-sustenance but for the market. As a result, the labor power of the firsthand producers became a commodity to be sold in the capitalist production process (Katz 1993:366). This development was called the “primitive,” or “primary,” accumulation process, and its emergence was a result of the separation of direct producers from products of their labor (Holton 1981:842). At this point, the social relations of production changed, assuming a new form. Thus, Marx explained the primitive accumulation of capital not in terms of trade but in terms of the class struggle that resulted from the conflict between the productive forces. Furthermore, he believed that the accumulation of capital in Western Europe and material progress did not come into being as a result of the action of merchants or the capitalist class but as a consequence of the actions of the subordinate class, namely the peasant (Katz 1993:370).

With the emancipation of peasants and serfs from the feudal lords, the populations in the towns increased greatly. This perpetuated the emergence of small towns in Europe, where the division of labor was more developed than in the country side, and this division of labor was predominantly based on the separation of production and trade. The number of these towns increased as the disintegration of the feudal system continued. This new formation in Europe was depicted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1947) as follows:

The expansion of trade and manufacture accelerated the accumulation of movable capital, while in the guilds, which were not stimulated to extend their production; natural capital remained stationary or even declined. Trade and manufacture created the big bourgeoisie, which no longer was dominant in the towns as formerly but had to bow to the might of the great merchants and manufacturers. (p. 52-53)

The vibrant communication between these towns facilitated trade further, which in turn brought the disintegration of feudalism since the serfs and the peasants could escape from the oppression of the feudal lords.

The struggle and the conflict between classes are the central part of the Marxist social change theory. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels (1947) believed that

the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (p. 3)

In addition, the class struggle and class relations are essential factors in the emergence of capitalism as a social and economic system. To Marx, the two main classes that constitute the capitalist society are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

How does Marx define class? What are his criteria for a group to be called a class? I will provide the answer to these two questions before I continue my discussion of the role the class struggle played in the emergence of capitalism from the Marxist perspective. First of all, there are three main social groups, classified as the owners of labor-power, owners of

capital, and land owners. Second, in pre-capitalist society there were landed aristocracy and nascent bourgeoisies. Third, the capitalists, the professional men, and the middle classes were included in the bourgeoisie category, and this class becomes central and the basis of the modern capitalist society. Finally, class was defined in terms of its function and status.

While the former could be decided by the values of the individuals constituting class, the latter could be decided by how the members of classes lived their lives (Caute 1967:67-68).

According to Marx, the transformation from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode of production came about in the form of a peasant class struggle against feudal lordship. In England, which is the second hegemonic country in the Wallersteinian world system, the transformation took place as the result of peasants' success against feudal lords in extracting an economic surplus from the rent. The lords in turn reduced the peasants to commercial tenants and wage laborers. This struggle between the opposite classes in the early 15<sup>th</sup> century brought about the transition from serfdom to peasant proprietorship, which was the process that created the genesis of capitalism in terms of the theory of class conflict (Katz 1993).

How classes initiate a struggle against an antagonistic class is determined by the realization of a common condition of exploitation. However, the removal of conditions of exploitation does not necessarily bring about a new form of society, but it dissolves the contending class. Thus, Katz (1993:382) says, "The triumph of capitalist production, however, was the result of class struggles that occurred both prior to and quite independently of the development of the productive forces." Furthermore, Marx believed that in order for capitalism to emerge, it was necessary that both and labor products assume a commodity form, and this transformation was partly caused by merchant capital. In addition, it was



important that the direct producers were separated from the control over products of their labor (Holton 1981:842). Consequently, we can argue that, for Marx, the forces of production, the relations of production, the struggles and the conflict between classes, the commodity of labor, and the products are important factors in the emergence of a capitalist system.

As for Wallerstein, the market exchange relations that are regularized by one universalized international division of labor are the most important components in the emergence of a world capitalist system (Holton 1981:841). Wallerstein was not the first person who argued that capitalism was triggered by the emergence of worldwide trade. Brenner (1977:28) argues that Frank asserted that the roots of the evolution of capitalism were embedded in the rise of commercial networks formed between Venice, the Iberian Peninsula, Northwestern European towns, the Mediterranean world, and sub-Saharan Africa. Venice was a state deeply reliant on Mediterranean trade to an extent that it could divert a crusader army against Seljuk Turks in Anatolia in 1204 to protect its trade in this region, at the risk of breaking from Europe. Moreover, starting with the conquest of Constantinople, the Venetians had to create mutual bonds of friendship with the Ottomans because the latter had a strong rival, the Persian State, to the east, while the former had rival states in Italy and in Western Europe, such as Spain and France. It is noteworthy that since the times of the Roman Empire, no political entity had been able to construct one unified system to bring the trade in the Mediterranean Sea under control until the Ottomans did it under the reign of Sultan Selim I with the conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516 and 1517 (Goffman 2002). The Ottoman control of trade in the Mediterranean Sea was consolidated with these conquests

and lasted for the coming centuries because the entire North African region fell into the hands of the Ottoman State.

If trade played one of the most important roles in the development of the world system as it is argued by the advocates of this theory, as I pointed out above, then the exclusion of the Ottomans from this picture would be incompatible with the very logic underpinning the theory itself. As a matter of fact, Wallerstein was criticized for placing the role of trade at the center of the development of capitalism and de-emphasizing the role of the transformation of class (Brenner 1977). Furthermore, the Wallersteinian conceptualization of the capitalist world economy as core/semi-periphery and periphery is not sufficient to explain the social relations of production, which are crucial characteristics of capitalism as a mode of production. Therefore, Bergesen (1984) wrote,

the Marxist repeat their charge that class is ignored and, the world-system theorists repeat their claim that the unequal exchange of the core/periphery division of labor is the central fact of the world economy. To move beyond this moribund debate, we must rethink the whole idea of class and realize that the question of the ownership and control of the means of production is not just a societal question. There is also the question of who owns/controls the world's means of production. (p. 369)

While discussing the accession of the Dutch to hegemonic power, Wallerstein (1980:46) emphasizes the main role that the shipping industry played between 1500 and 1700, when the production of ships grew ten times over than previous times. In parallel with the growing industrialization that was mainly composed of ship building and textiles, there was a specialization in the agriculture sector in Holland, which made it a self sustaining economy. Moreover, Wallerstein (1980:47-49) argues that as soon as the Dutch developed

sophisticated ships, they embarked upon trade in the Mediterranean Sea and East Indies, mainly between 1590 and 1630. The trade was mainly in spices, luxuries, grain, cloth and some other goods that were leaving a great profit for the merchants. On the basis of this argument, Brenner (1977) wrote that “what is essential is to see that the basic theoretical underpinnings for the positions set out by all three of these writers (Immanuel Wallerstein, Paul Sweezy, and Gunder A. Frank) is the model put forward by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I” (p. 33). Accordingly, what Smith defended in order for a nation to develop and prosper was the separation of agriculture and manufacture. With the specialization of productive forces, the former could be achieved in the country, whereas the latter would take place in towns. The reason that this specialization would bring prosperity and self-sustaining growth was because of the assumption that producers’ concentration on one kind of product rather than many would yield a great amount of products to be sold in the market.

The last theoretical perspective on the development of capitalism and the emergence of the world system that I want to present is comes from the notion that the elite classes are the sole driving force behind the changes necessary for the development of the modern world system. Lachmann (1990) defines elite as “a group of rulers with the capacity to appropriate resources from non-elite who inhabit a distinct organizational apparatus” (p. 401). The two main elite theories, expounded by Mosca and Pareto, rest upon the notion that the organization created by the elite ruling class to appropriate surplus from producing classes functioned in transition from feudalism to capitalism. While the former sees the military force as the ruling class responsible for the rise of the bourgeoisie by expelling them from the rural areas to the important capitalist city centers, the latter proposed a life cycle of elite

theory for the explanation of the bourgeoisies' rise to power. Both theorists see the conflict among the elites themselves as the foundation of change rather than the conflict between the elite and non-elites (Lachmann 1990).

### CHAPTER 3: THE INTERSECTION OF THE WEST AND THE EAST

Could the “European” modern world system have emerged if the Ottomans had never been in Europe? How has the presence of the Ottoman Empire made a contribution to the rise of this modern world system? The answers to these two basic questions will illuminate the extent to which the existence of the Ottoman state in Europe and in the surroundings of Europe played a role in the emergence of the modern world system. I will endeavor to demonstrate the facts, showing how the Ottoman Empire and European world were in constant interaction, that took place in different forms that were important in the emergence of the world system but were not discussed in the Wallersteinian model.

There is a tendency among Western scholars to assign the role that the Eastern civilizations played in the progress of human beings to a lower position. Sometimes this attitude among these groups of scholars is observed to such an extreme degree that anything non-Western is totally ignored by them. To make my point clearer, I want to give an example from one of the books that I read recently: While discussing the emergence of pre-industrial cities, Sjoberg (1960:53, 54) names more than six cities that emerged in the lands of present-day Turkey, such as Troy, Smyrna (Izmir: this is the city where I went to high school), Ephesus, Ankara, Tarsus, Permagum, and some other cities as well as several civilizations, but he refers to this geography as Asia Minor and never mentions that they are located in today’s Turkey. On the other hand, while giving an example of Carthage as a pre-industrial city, he does not fail to mention Spain as the geography where the city is located. If someone is curious to locate these cities on a world map, will he/she be able to find where Asia Minor is as opposed to being able to find Turkey, which has existed as a nation state since 1923 and is an inheritor of the Ottoman Empire? Moreover, someone who is familiar

with Turkey will interpret this situation as the fact that Western scholars just do not want to admit that the Turkish state is rich with culture, history, and civilization that could be benefited from. For example, the Lydian, the civilization that introduced money into trade for the first time, was occupying the Aegean, and the Sumerians, who invented writing, were based in Mesopotamia. A study of these two civilization and many others that existed in Turkey would make a great contribution to the understanding of the relationships between different past societies and how their cultures and civilizations diffused over time.

#### A. The Global Struggle between the Ottomans and the Portuguese

There are several ways in which the Ottomans played significant positive roles in the emergence of the modern European world system. The political rivalry between the Portuguese seaborne empire and the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean, the Venetian and the Ottoman multipurpose association, the alliance between the French and the Ottomans, and the political struggle between the Austria-Hungarian Empire and the Ottomans as balancing powers in Europe will be my main evidence indicating the extent to which the Ottoman civilization played a role in the emergence of modern world system. Once I shed light on these historical events, it will be clear that we cannot place the Ottomans in the periphery-country category at all. Furthermore, a theory that did not place the Ottoman State into its proper position would be incomplete and remain “Eurocentric.” It will be more accurate if we say it is going to remain “Halfeurocentric,” since the Ottomans are themselves a Eurasian Empire, having first emerged on the European continent with the conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople), which connects Europe and Asia.

It is commonly accepted by historians that the Ottomans expanded until 1699 and from that point on, for the first time, they started to decline. The process of decline lasted for two centuries, but the Ottomans were still strong enough to be a balancing power in Europe, although not as much as they used to be when they were a world power. During this time period, the Ottomans to the west had a border with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to the east, they had a border with the Persian Empire. Although the Ottomans twice attempted to capture Vienna, they never succeeded. However, they played a major role in the politics of Europe that I will explain further in this chapter. Three major seas also came under Ottoman rule during the expansion era: the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Red Sea.

With the conquest of Arab lands and especially Basra in 1546, the Ottomans gained access to the Persian Gulf, from where they sailed on the Indian Ocean to curb the influence of the Portuguese. Although Ozbaran (1994:16-17) argues by quoting from Bernard Lewis that the Ottoman period of Arab history and the Ottoman's presence on the Indian Ocean are not studied to a great extent, there is still enough evidence that the Ottomans reacted promptly to the new developments in the Indian Ocean as much as their resources allowed them to. Ozbaran himself relied mainly upon the Portuguese sources that are preserved in the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, which are the oldest and most important in understanding the struggle between the Portuguese and the Turks to control the Indian Ocean. Hess (1973) also says, "Since, at the turn of the sixteenth century, it is Ottoman history that is relatively unstudied, a judgment on the strength of this empire in relation to both Islamic and European states would go a long way toward drawing a more correct picture of sixteenth-century history" (p. 57). Therefore, it is important to point out that further study of the Portuguese and Turkish state archives is needed, and it will reveal more information

about the confrontations between the Ottomans and the Portuguese to control the Indian Ocean and the trade there.

What is the significance of the struggle between Portugal and the Ottoman State in terms of the development of the world system? What were the consequences of this struggle? I argue that the Portuguese could not establish themselves in the Indian Ocean because of the presence of the Ottoman Empire there. As a result, even though Portugal was one of the first Western European states to start the discoveries, they could never ascend to a hegemonic power position. If it were not for the presence of the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean, Portugal could have established a land empire as well as a seaborne empire that would have changed the course of history.

When the Portuguese arrived in India, they came across Turkish cannons that were being used by the different states like Gujarat and Ethiopia, and some others Muslim countries in this part of the world. The Portuguese seamen were aware of the Turkish presence and its influence among the indigenous population to the extent that they were involved in different activities to establish full control in the Indian Ocean and surpass the Ottomans. For instance, they kept their king informed about the types of weapons and ships the Ottomans possessed in the area. In fact, the Portuguese's main goals in setting off for the Indian Ocean were to replace the Venetians as the sole distributors of Asian products and to join the Eastern Christians in an attack on the Ottomans from the rear (Hess 1970). To illustrate further how the Portuguese were trying to surpass the military technology of the Ottomans, Ozbaran (1994) gives an example: "Albuquerque, who is considered to be the initiator of the Portuguese expansion in Asia, in a letter to the King of Portugal in December 22, 1510, wrote, "I am sending to your highness samples of the *Rumi* arms of the Goa *Rumi*



and a mould sample produced by the Muslims” (p. 62). The Ottomans did not possess a more inferior military technology in this area than the Portuguese. The fact that the latter could not take full control of the trade in the Ocean proves this hypothesis. Moreover, Chase (2003:134) argues that when, for the first time, Europeans appeared on the shore of the Indian Ocean, they found that Turks and Arabs were far ahead of them in terms of military technology and trading. Being aware of the superiority of the Ottomans, when the king of Portugal first sent his fleet to the area, at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century he instructed the crews not to come close to Turks in order to ensure the safety of their ships. Therefore, the Portuguese were to fight from the sea and not to engage in any land wars with the Ottomans.

The Ottomans, while dealing with the Portuguese, took advantage of being the caliphate of the Muslim world. Upon conquering Egypt in 1517, the caliphate was transferred from the Mamluks to the Ottomans. In this respect, we can argue that the Ottoman World was another unique system that was not subdued to Western European powers, but as I have been arguing throughout this study, it constantly interacted with the Europeans. The Shah of Hormuz, the Sultanate of Gujarat, and the ruler of Atjeh asked for help from the Ottoman sultan to expel the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean but not from any other core-like countries that fall in Wallerstein’s category. This is a good example that indicates how the Ottomans played a balancing power role in the Southeast Asia region, thousands of miles away from their capital city. This militaristic interception upon the request of the countries in trouble with the Europeans is not different from the United States government’s interception in different parts of the world to continue its hegemonic position in the modern world system. While the Ottomans were intervening in the new formations in the Indian Ocean, they were also playing the role of balancing power in Europe. In 1572,

when the Polish were going to have a new ruler as a result of the termination of the Jagiello dynasty, Sultan Selim II opposed any princes from the Hapsburg Empire to succeed the old dynasty. Accordingly, a new prince was chosen from France, which indicates that the Ottomans could alter the policies in Europe in line with their interests (Faroqhi 2004).

The symbiosis between the Ottoman World and the Western World had a tremendous effect upon the emergence of the world system that was bypassed by Immanuel Wallerstein. The fact that the Ottoman military technology was far ahead of that of any other Muslim State elevated the prestige and the status of the Ottomans among other Islamic countries. Ozbaran (1994), as I mentioned above, states,

The Estado da India, Portuguese Eastern Empire, was no doubt threatening the existence of various states in the Indian Ocean from the coast of Africa to the Malay-Indonesian area. The Shah of Hormuz, Sharafaddin sent a letter to Sultan Suleyman for help to expel the Portuguese from this strategic place. The ruler of Gujarat in India also sought for Ottoman military help. (p. 71)

All these historical events indicate that the Ottomans were still a balancing power in the world long after the world system emerged in Europe. They did not have the characteristics of peripheral states that were serving as market places and were exploited the by core countries of Europe. As long as the Ottoman Empire is excluded from the world system, Wallerstein's theory will remain a geographically bounded theory. We will have to admit that the core countries could only spring from the Western European zone and the Americas, which are also Europe related. The United States of America, which I believe to be the only hegemonic country in the Wallersteinian model to possess core-like characteristics to a full extent, is following a very similar militaristic, political, and economic course of action like

the Ottomans were following in the 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. As the presence of American military bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, the Arab Peninsula, Turkey, and many other countries sustain the hegemony of the United States in the world system, similarly, the Ottoman military in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Coast, the Indian Ocean, Europe, the Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea sustained its hegemony in the world. Starting with Sultan Mehmed II, who conquered Constantinople at the age of 21 in 1453, the Ottomans' Sultans saw the world as being too small for more than one ruler. In order to make sure that there would be only one ruler in the world, Sultan Mehmed II attempted to conquer Rome and dispatched his fleet to Otranto but died in 1481 before fulfilling his ambitions. Selim I, following the same ideology, embarked upon Mamluk's Empire with such success that the Ottomans' Sultans became the rulers of the Muslim World.

Chase wrote, "Like Spain, the other great imperial power of the 1500s and 1600s, the Ottomans remained at best a second-rank power throughout the 1700s and 1800s, but their attitude toward firearms was not responsible" (2003:93). In order to indicate the extent to which the Ottomans were involved in a struggle with Portugal, it is important to point out that the Muslim Sultanate of Gujarat and Aceh received help from the Ottoman State in many different forms, which deterred the Portuguese from creating a longlasting hegemony over trade in the Indian Ocean. However, it is equally important to point out that the Ottomans dedicated only a small number of ships and troops to the struggle with Portugal that produced desired results. This small militaristic commitment indicates that Ottomans were in possession of a strong military, which is a characteristic of a core country. The facts that the Ottomans sent firearms to the Muslims in Ethiopia in 1527, Mustafa Pasha and Mustafa Rumi Khan helped the State of Gujarat to defend Diu against Portugal, and 300 Ottoman

soldiers were sent to Aceh in 1530 to stop the Portuguese indicate the capacity of the Ottomans to change world affairs to their advantage (Chase 2003). Sometimes helping those countries took the forms of training the native troops and teaching the locals how to make guns, which resulted in their capacity to fight back against the Portuguese.

Although the Ottomans were in conflict with different military and economically strong states in the East, such as Safavids and the Hungarian Empire, the Spanish, and some other European States in the West, they did not neglect the new formations in the Indian Ocean. Another reaction that the Ottomans took against the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean, for instance, was to send the governor of Egypt, Suleyman Pasa, to Diu, India in 1538. Pasa took Yemen and Suez on the way back to Egypt. This consolidated Ottoman control over the Mediterranean, while it ended Portuguese control of the spice trade from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.

The conflict between the Ottoman State and Portugal continued for almost the entire 16<sup>th</sup> century. Neither side could succeed in establishing a lasting hegemony over the trade and politics in the Indian Ocean. However, the Ottomans managed to develop a land empire on the Arabian and east African shores, which necessitated a strong naval presence (Kunt and Woodhead 1995). Similarly, the Portuguese managed to establish a seaborne empire, and they temporarily blocked the Red Sea and the Gulf to increase their domination over the Indian Ocean. However, the Portuguese domination over the Indian Ocean did not last long since it was very costly for them to have long voyages from Lisbon to India and to exceed the Ottoman ships' capacity to carry goods. Parallel to this, the Venetians' cooperation with the Ottomans in doing trade in the Mediterranean gave an advantage to the Ottomans to strengthen their dominance over the commerce in the Indian Ocean and from there to the

Mediterranean Sea (Hess 1973). Inalcik (1995) also argues that when the Ottomans took over Arab countries between 1516 and 1550, they were in full control of the trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. He gives an example of the taxes levied on spices going from Mecca to Damascus as 110 thousand gold ducats, and these spices (the customers of which could be European merchants) were transported further to Bursa and Istanbul.

## B. The Ottomans' Rise to Global World Power

Were the Ottomans a more European state, or did they have an Asian state's characteristics? What made it possible for the Ottomans to progress into the heart of the European lands where they stayed for centuries? How did the presence of the Ottomans in the European landscape affect the developments in Europe that led to the emergence of the modern world system? What were the factors that led the Ottomans, who were a small band, to succeed against the European nations, which had a long history and experience of warfare? I will devote the rest of this chapter to providing answers to these questions to indicate that the Ottomans had a core-country characteristic as far as Wallerstein's world system theory goes. Moreover, the struggle between the Ottoman State and Europeans made a great contribution to the development of the modern world, which is a fact that can be more explicitly presented once the Ottomans' history is studied further.

With the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans terminated the last remnants of the East Roman Empire, and they acquired the inheritance of the Byzantium Empire, which elevated them to the position of a European state. From this point on, the Ottomans' associations with the other states in Europe went beyond commercial and military

relationships. The Ottomans adapted a policy different from those of many other conquering states by preserving the structure of the system of the country that they took over. Thus, having taken over the Byzantium Empire, the Ottomans followed similarly by utilizing religious ideology to control the different population and by implementing a tax structure to gain more resources, like their predecessor did (Goffman 2002). Since the Ottomans had a strong military, the Europeans could no longer sack Istanbul and disrupt the trade in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

The capture of Istanbul by the Turks gave the Ottomans a strategic position that any state would struggle to have. Located on the two sides of the strait that connects the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, Istanbul had been a flourishing center of commerce. When the Ottomans took the city, they controlled the flow of trade between the Greeks and Genoese on one side and the European on the other. These two nations were supplying grain, horses, and fish to Europe from the Black Sea (Coles 1968). The Ottomans could have disrupted this trade altogether or diverted its direction to somewhere else when they finally controlled the entire Black Sea at the end of the reign of Medmet II, the Conqueror, in 1481. Nevertheless, the Ottoman state gave priority to the continuation of trade with Europe despite the endless conflict with it. Tilly (1992) points out this fact: “For the 500 years before 1492, the fortunes of Europe depended heavily on Muslims-Arabs, Turks, and others who in various guises linked the Europeans to the rest of the Eurasian system of trade and empire” (p. 2).

What did change for the Ottomans when they started to transform from a nomadic society to a state was that they started maritime activity. The Turks were known as the steppe nomads who were good at riding horses and camels. They were very good warriors

on land, a skill that they acquired as the result of engaging other Asian states that did not have boundaries with seas either. Hess (1970) argues that as the Ottomans established themselves in Anatolia, the area of the world that housed many states with strong naval capacities that developed over a long period of time, the Ottoman rulers realized that only by taking the seas could they extend their gaze to the northern Christian states. No other Turkic state or emirates in Anatolia attempted to develop a navy to confront the Byzantium, the Venetians, and the crusaders and prevent them from dominating the seas around Anatolia.

Having developed a naval power, the Ottomans started to expand in Europe during the reign of the second Sultan in throne, Orhan Gazi, who ruled the Ottomans between 1326 and 1359. The Ottomans' success against the Europeans increased their prestige among the other Turko-Muslim states and tribes, which functioned as a reservoir for the Ottomans in terms of manpower. The ability of the Ottomans to use diplomacy when necessary, combined with the support from other Turkish emirates and their people, made the Ottomans progress swiftly in Europe swiftly. For example, when the Ottomans for the first time crossed the Dardanelles Straits to wage war against the Europeans, they obtained help from the Byzantium, with whom they established skillful militaristic and marriage alliances (Goffman 2002). Once the Ottomans crossed to Europe, they secured their independence from any imperial control, which allowed them to colonize the European coast of the Sea of Marmora and, subsequently, capture Adrianople and Gallipoli. By the end of 1370, the Ottomans had filled the vacuum left by the Byzantium Empire in the area, and they eventually settled in Bulgaria and part of Greece, becoming the neighbor of the Serbian Empire (Coles 1968).

The significance of the presence of the Ottomans in Europe by filling the vacuum left by the Byzantium Empire in terms of the emergence of world system theory lies in the historical shifts in the relationships between the Western and Eastern worlds. Before the Ottomans were elevated to the status of statehood, there was chaos, destruction, and pillage across the two continents. From the West were coming the Latin European crusaders, who disrupted the trade in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. From the East came the Mongolian armies battering the whole Islamic World in Eastern Asia and Anatolia (Lewis 1990). In addition to this, the Europeans were suffering from many diseases that wiped out the population, and they were in constant wars against each other. Cipolla (1965) argues that Europe was very vulnerable to attacks from outsiders, aside from the invasions of their neighbors within the continent itself. For this reason, he believes that the Europeans' continued existence depended on God but not on the Europeans themselves.

As I discussed in my introduction, there are several theories explaining the rapid expansion of the Ottomans into the European continent at the early stages of the development of this incipient state. I believe that the Ottomans' flexibility with different political and social realms, as well as their ability to collaborate with the different states around them in the form of creating alliances with them, gave the Ottomans the chance to advance into the heart of Europe. A good example of how the Ottomans utilized an opportunity to advance their cause is when they accepted an offer from a Hungarian gun-founder, named Orban, during the siege of Constantinople. At that time, this city had the most daunting defense system, which no army could penetrate. Cipolla (1965:93-94) informs us that Medmed II welcomed the renegade and ordered him to make a gun that the Ottomans tested against the Venetian galley, which sank with one stone hurled from the gun. Upon this remarkable



success, the Sultan ordered Orban to build another gun twice as big. This second gun had to be carried by more than 100 oxen, and it took the soldiers two hours to load it. Of course, it was not just because of this gun that the armies of Sultan Memmed II were able to break through the walls of the Byzantines, but his maneuvers at the right time and the right place were the decisive components in the success of the Ottomans. The significance of this war for the world and the European history was that the balance of power shifted from the East to the West. The Nations of Archers, which were mainly Central Asian oriented, could not subdue the societies of the Eastern Mediterranean as a result of the development of cannons, fire-arms, and war ships by the Ottomans (Hess 1973). A similar example in the history of the United States' is when Americans dropped two atomic bombs over Japan reminds us that a super technology at a time of war is important in triumphing over one's opponent. In fact, Wallerstein marks the end of the Second World War as the time when the United States was elevated to hegemonic power in this modern world system. Similarly, when the Ottomans took Constantinople, they became a European state, eventually becoming a world power that impacted the European realm.

The Ottoman state had a multicultural society, which came into being as a result of the acceptance of different nationalities and ethnicities. As the Ottoman state expanded into Europe, Asia, and Africa, it incorporated new people into its society. The Ottoman government ruled its society according to Islamic Law, although non-Muslims such as Armenians, the Greek Orthodox, and the Jews in this society had their own religious communities. In addition, the Dutch, Venetian, English and French who lived in the Ottoman society solved their matters in their own courts, which were established in main

trading cities (Goffman 2002). Furthermore, the merchants were exempt from some rules of the religious law established to constitute fair deal in the market. Inalcik (1995) wrote,

In an Ottoman 'Mirror-for-Princes,' Sinan Pasa's Ma'arifname written in the second half of the fifteen century, the ruler is advised: Look with a favor on the merchants in the land; always care for them; let no one harass them; let no one order them about, for through their trading the land becomes prosperous, and by their wares cheapens abounds in the world; through them the excellent fame of the Sultan is carried to surrounding lands, and by them the wealth within the land is increased. (p. 119)

When the Ottomans' and Venetians' relationship deteriorated as a result of the wars between the two states in 1463 to 1479, Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror, gave new privileges to Florence to keep the trade between the Ottoman State and the European states flowing. In 1501, when a cargo of silk that belonged to the Florence merchants was stolen, the sultan sent to the area government officials who found some part of the merchandise, and the value for the other part was paid by the locals (Inalcik 1973). This is only one good example of the importance that the Ottoman sultans gave to safe trade in their territory.

The Ottoman state fitted the commercial Mediterranean world better than any other state could. The competition between the European states and the Ottomans over the trade in the Mediterranean tilted to the European side over time as a result of the discoveries of the New World. When the Ottomans established themselves in the Mediterranean, they did not destroy the sea ports, the towns, or the inlands that were commercial centers, like the Crusaders did in 1204. A safe environment for conducting business that could be provided by a powerful state machine was indispensable for the development of capitalism. The Ottoman state, by filling the vacuum created by the fall of Byzantium Empire, fulfilled this

role by regulating and controlling the trade in the Mediterranean. This sea was functioning as a conduit between Europe and Asia, which were two main business partners.

Starting from the time of Sultan Mehmet II, the Ottomans sought different ways to revive trade in the Mediterranean. The Sultan took several measures to revive the capital city, such as providing tax exemption for Christian merchants, gathering different skilled artisans to the capital, bringing naval technology to the city, and launching public programs (Hess 1970:1901). Another tactic that the Ottoman sultans used to help trade flourish was to give monopolies to the European states in exchange for military help. In as early as 1352, the Ottomans gave the Genoese a monopoly over alum, which was the main source of the textile industry in Europe. In return, the Genoese fleet carried Ottoman troops over to Europe through the Straits of Dardanelles in 1421 and 1444, when the Ottomans defeated crusader armies. Similarly, Sultan Mehmet I gave Venice capitulations to export Anatolian wheat and permission to install bailo in Istanbul and privileges to the Venetian merchants to trade in the Ottoman state to conciliate them during the siege of Constantinople (Inalcik 1973). Furthermore, as the Portuguese tried to dominate the trade between Europe and Southeast Asia, Sultan Selim I, who conquered Egypt and Syria, accepted Khair as-Din (Hayreddin) Barbarossa's offer to enter into his service in order to maintain free trade in the Mediterranean (Clot, 1992). Consequently, Hess (1970) says that "along with the Russians, the Safavids, the Mughals, the Venetians, and the Ragusans, the Ottomans had molded imperial and commercial structures that ran perpendicular to the older political and economic organization of the Eurasian steppe" (p. 1915). This role that the Ottomans played increased the intensity of the trade between the East and the West, which was important in the emergence of new trade-based colonial states, such as Portugal, Spain, Holland, and other

states that constituted the core in the world system. The well-established trade network in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean, which came into existence as the result of several Muslim states around the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula and their pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina via sea routes, was protected and developed further by the Ottomans (Lewis 1990). The Europeans learned about this network from the Ottomans as they continued doing business on Ottoman soil as the result of incentives coming from the sultans. The fact that the Indian merchants traveled to Aleppo through Basra and Hicaz with cotton prints and painted cotton fabrics documents the connection between the West and East as Ottoman patented (Faroghi, 2004).

#### C. The Ottoman's Alliances with the Europeans against Spain

The relations between the Ottomans and the French in relation to the Spanish Hapsburg Empire and other European states are important in the emergence of the world system. The Ottoman sultans did not hesitate to support the European states and form alliances with them if this could advance their influence over Europe. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and King Francois I of France allied against the Hungarian Empire to curb the influence of the Spanish in Europe. The fact that the Ottomans sponsored the coalition of France, the German princes, and England against Charles V by giving the French King 100,000 pieces of gold indicates the level of the alliance between these two powers. In addition, the Ottomans supported the Calvinist and Protestants to prevent them from coalitions with the Pope and the Emperor. Inalcik (1995) wrote,

Later on in a letter to Lutheran princes in the Low Countries and in other lands subject Spain, the sultan (Suleiman I) offered military help and saw them as standing

close to him since they did not worship idols, believed in one God and fought against the Hungary and Transylvania, which became a Calvinist and Unitarian stronghold in the seventeenth century. (p. 117)

Sultan Selim II (in reign from 1566 to 1574), following his father's example, sent messengers to the leaders of the Protestant movement in the Netherlands. In addition to this, he attempted to establish connections between the Moriscos in Spain and the Protestants under Philip II's control. These efforts resulted in a cooperation of the Dutch and the Ottoman state against the Spanish navy in the western Mediterranean. This, in turn, ended the Spanish influence in the Mediterranean and set off a relationship between the Dutch and the Ottomans (Hess 1968:19-22). It is convincingly argued that Ottoman pressure on the Hapsburgs was an important factor in the extension of Protestantism in Europe. The protection of the dissenters by the Ottomans was very important in the development of trade and scientific progress in Europe. As Chirot (1985) argues, the Hapsburg Empire, which was an ally of the Catholic Church, did not tolerate the mercantile middle classes, non-conformist thought, or new developments, but they could not contain the aforementioned elements in northern Germany, the northern low Countries, France, Switzerland, and England. As the world power of that time, the Ottomans' help to the Calvinists and the Lutherans, as well as their successful military campaigns against the Hungarian Empire on the European landscape and in the western Mediterranean, had a great impact on Europe because while the former thrived, the latter experienced decline. Furthermore, it is argued that the Dutch Republic's survival was dependent on the capacity of the Spanish-Hungarian Empire to contain the new religious, political, and economic movements in Europe. Since they had to conduct war on

two fronts, in the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe, against the Ottomans, they did not succeed in preserving their short-lived domination over these two territories (Faroqhi 2004).

The trade in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Indian Ocean in the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the Ottomans were the world power, financed the progress of science and technology in Europe. Specifically, the Portuguese exchanged the goods that they brought from the East with the artillery guns produced by the German and Flemish gunners (Cipolla 1965). The same author argues that the Portuguese and Spaniards could not defeat the Ottomans with these new guns that they had acquired. Nevertheless, in the following centuries, the Ottomans were not able to develop militaristic technology to cope with the rival European states. It is noteworthy that the Europeans could not breach the Ottomans' dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Indian Ocean throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century, even when they possessed these new guns that Cipolla sees as important in the expansion of the European states. If the nations of colonized parts of the world like Africa and the Americas, had military capacities similar to that of the Ottomans, the Europeans could not have expanded there and, ultimately, the modern world system would not have emerged. A possible prolonged military conflict with the nations in Africa and the Americas would have debilitated the strength of Western European countries, thereby preventing them from becoming core countries. Since capitalism developed as a result of surplus value, which was often extracted from these areas of the world, any state with developed military technology could have stopped the progress of the Western Europe. As the Western European countries and the Ottomans continued engaging in conflicts with each other, the Europeans realized that they could not expand their dominion where the Ottomans were present, so they shifted

their focus to the New World. This process did not take place until the late 17<sup>th</sup> century although the New World was discovered in the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

How the Europeans suddenly advanced in military technology, such as new guns, sturdy ships, and the knowledge for utilizing them in a war, should be explored further. Did this advanced military technology just emerge out of nowhere? Or did the Europeans develop better guns and ships as they conflicted with the Ottomans, to whom they lost battles, with few exceptions, for centuries? In the same manner, the Europeans were not the first people who started engaging in trade intensively, which brought about the surplus. The trade existed in the Mediterranean for a long period of time before the discoveries made by the Europeans, and it continued after that.

There was a developed merchant class in the Ottoman state as a result of the diverse character of the Ottoman society and the large geography that it extended over. The existence of this merchant class was linked to the network of trade routes that were crossing the Ottoman land. Also, the fact that this world power was located at the crossroads between the West and the East made the trade a lucrative profession among some ethnic groups in the Ottoman society, but it also drew a large number of the Western Europeans to the Ottoman Society (see Table 1).

Table 1: Trade Routes on the Ottoman Soil

Caravan Routes	Starting Center	Ending Center	Centers Between	Goods
1	<b>Iran</b>	<b>Bursa</b>	Tokat, Amasya	
2	<b>Aleppo</b>	<b>Istanbul</b>	Adana Konya	Arabian, Indian
3	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>Istanbul</b>	Antalya	Rice, wheat, barley, spices, sugar
4	<b>Caffa</b>	<b>Istanbul</b>	Sinop	Butter, cheese, honey, flour, wheat and tallow
5	<b>Ragusa</b>	<b>Istanbul</b>		
6	<b>Marseilles</b>	<b>Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis</b>	Various cities in Europe	
7	<b>London</b>	<b>Aleppo</b>	Istanbul, Izmir, Salonica	Woolen cloth, Iranian silk
8	<b>India</b>	<b>Venice (Italy)</b>	Damascus, Cairo	Spice, fabrics, coffee
9	<b>Newfoundland-Africa</b>	<b>North America</b>	England	Slaves
10	<b>Newfoundland-Africa</b>	<b>Mediterranean</b>		Mainly fishes



This merchant class was mainly composed of Armenians, Jews, Venetians, and Genoese, and later in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the British played a vital role in the continuation of trade across the Ottoman lands. The significance of this trade is that it brought the Western world and the Eastern world together, as the Ottoman rulers encouraged and facilitated the free movement of the merchants. For example, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent sent a letter to Don Sebastian, the King of Portugal, offering him peaceful relationships and requesting that the Portuguese terminate their hostile acts toward the merchants and pilgrims sailing in the Indian Ocean (Faroghi 2004). The fact that these two states were in conflict, both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, did not stop the Sultan from attempting to institute such relationships. In a similar way, in order to secure trade against the Spaniards, Queen Elizabeth appealed to Sultan Murad III (in reign 1574-1595) to do business in each other's domains without any restrictions. This request was accepted by the Sultan, who sent a group of envoys to London to consolidate the relationship with England (Matar 1999).

Aside from the fact that the Ottoman state was located in a strategic location suitable for trade and the inheritance of the civilizations that were based on trade, the Ottomans' political structure paved the way for mercantilism. Certain non-Muslim ethnicities could become neither state nor military officials and chose instead to concentrate on some other professions. The Greeks were mainly marines, the Armenians were involved in international trade and brokerage, and the Jewish did business in textile manufacturing (Goffman 2002). The Ottomans gave importance to the merchant class and protected it with their strong navy and army when it was necessary. As the Ottoman Empire annexed new territories, the merchant class found new potential markets that they profited from to a great extent. The

expansion of the Empire brought merchants from England, France, and Holland to Istanbul and to the Levant as the Ottoman sultans bolstered trade in their domains by signing different treaties with the European countries at different times.

## CHAPTER 4: THE OTTOMANS AND THE ONE-WORLD SYSTEM

In this final chapter of my thesis, I attempt to place the Ottoman Empire into its proper location in the world system to present a more holistic and accurate picture of the development of the modern world system. Since this system emerged within the geopolitical boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, it is imperative to discuss the role that the Ottomans played in the course of the events that led to this emergence. Previous studies that were done to link the Ottomans to the Wallersteinian world system by Faruk Tabak and Immanuel Wallerstein himself focused on the 18<sup>th</sup>-century Ottoman world, which was very different from how the Ottoman Empire was during the centuries when the modern world was coming into existence. Therefore, my study is important, as it reveals the crucial historical facts indicating how the Ottomans' participation in the European politics and world economy gave rise to the modern world system.

As I discussed in Chapter One, Wallerstein is not the first person who wrote about the historical processes that led to the emergence of capitalism. In support of my argument, I presented several perspectives on the development of capitalism that were different from the Wallersteinian perspective. Wallerstein was mainly criticized as limiting the development of capitalism to a trade-based division of labor, which he treats as a single division of labor in world system. This division of labor came into being as a result of free wage labor, share cropping, slavery, and coerced cash cropping (Brenner 1977:54). Thus, Wallerstein does not consider class relations to be responsible for the development of capitalism, like Marx did, although he mainly relies on Marxist theory. Another criticism that is directed toward world system theory comes from Zolberg. Zolberg (1981:258) mainly argues that Wallerstein consciously neglects political structures and processes, and he links the system through

economy and fails to see the ‘system of modern states’ which was developing in the long ‘sixteenth century’ in Europe. He further argues that the alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire proved that religion, which was a dominant characteristic in the earlier periods, could not cement the European society anymore. Thus, the introduction of the Ottoman Empire into Europe helped preserved this ‘system of modern states,’ which was actually not peculiar only to this long century that Wallerstein chose as a vantage point.

I think that there was always one-world system, and all parts of the world were connected to each other mostly through trade, diplomacy, and wars. In this system, there were hegemonic powers that were advanced in terms of military and economy, and there were nations ruled by the hegemonic powers. The Roman Empire, Sumerians, Hittites, Byzantium, the Persian Empire, and Macedonia could be given as examples of different hegemonic powers that also functioned as core-like states. At this point, I want to delve into the concept of “empire” from the world system theorists’ perspective, since it is mainly used to discard the role that some civilizations played in this one-world system. According to the proponents of the world-system theory, the world empires are considered to be based on a tributary division of labor, which is a predominant division of labor between the core and periphery. This mode of division of labor is purportedly an obstacle to the accumulation of capital. The core and periphery areas of the world are controlled by one single political entity, which is called an empire (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995:390). The examples given by these two scholars and Wallerstein are Rome, China, the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and some other empires. I think that the Dutch and the English also created empires like the Ottomans and others, but they are treated as being the European core states rather than as

empires, since these categories serve Wallerstein better in the construction of his European-centric world system.

The biggest difference between today's modern world system, which we would say emerged at the turn of 15<sup>th</sup> century if we agree with Wallerstein, and the one world system that has been in existence forever is *the intensity of interaction* between the units composing the world system. Frank (1998:2), quoting Fernand Braudel, argues that Europeans used historians to promote their interest at home and in other parts of the world by showing that Europe was a capable continent that existed on its own and derived its energy from these dynamics. This endeavor undertaken by historians proved to be successful, as they received political, cultural, economic, and social support from ruling classes of the United States and Europe. Moreover, Frank (1998) wrote, "Other peoples like Africans, Japanese, South East Asians, and Central Asians received no mention as contributors to or even participants in history at all, except as 'barbarian' nomadic horses who periodically emerged out of Central Asia to make war on 'civilized' settled peoples" (1998:3).

How did the Western historians and other Western social scientists, especially sociologists like Marx and Weber and, in this case, Wallerstein, succeed in developing an argument that the West developed a unique system? To what extent should we be in agreement with these theoreticians that the modern world is a product of the European civilization? Did all parts of the world come into contact as a result of globalization that the European states supposedly initiated, or have all parts of the world been in contact forever? I believe that the answers to these questions will illuminate the darker side of the world system theory, and it will help us to better understand the extent to which the European states formed a different world system and how the Ottomans were participants in this formation.

To begin, I agree with Frank that Europe was not hegemonic militarily, economically, and politically in the world system until 1800. It is also historical fact, which I covered in my second chapter, that long before the Europeans became involved in trade and politics in the East, there was a developed trade between the Ottomans and India, the Ottomans and West Asia, and the Ottomans and Central Asia, China and India, and North Africa and India. Therefore, Frank's claim that Europe "climbed up on the back of Asia, and then stood on Asian shoulder temporarily" (1998:334) in the course of the development of the modern world system is acceptable. Additionally, Marx's theory that the Europe miracle of development is embedded in the class relations of feudalism and that the Asian mode of production, which was controlled by "oriental despots," served further to underpin the European ideology that European development was exceptional and that Europe was better than the rest of the world (Frank 1998:14). Weber, following in Marx's footsteps, also based his theory of the development of capitalism in Europe as a function of Protestant ethics. Weber believed that Protestant ethics were a moral rational code of ethics and that all other religions of the East and other societies were devoid of this rationality. However, a quick study of Eastern religions will prove that they are not devoid of rationality as Weber claims them to be. For instance, a few examples from Islam, the religion that is followed by more than one and a half billion people in today's world, will prove that the Weberian categories of religion at least do not apply to Islam. The prophet of Islam himself was involved in doing business by being in charge of a caravan going between Mecca and Syria. He also encouraged his followers to do business by saying that 90% of sustenance comes from trade. Moreover, Islam treats the individual's act of working as another form of worship, such as

praying five times a day or fasting during the month of Ramadan, as long as he/she is a true believer.

Second, the works and theories of Marx and Weber, two prominent sociologists, do not reflect the real circumstances of the Eastern societies and the contribution that their civilizations made to European civilization. Frank's criticism of Marx and Weber, that they analyze the Eastern world through the European glasses at first sight might, look radical, but it has a point when it is examined critically. Frank (1998) says that

In view of my past work, of special interest to me and perhaps to many of my readers are the notions of 'development,' 'modernization,' 'capitalism,' and even 'dependence,' or call it what you will. All are procrustean and empty categories; because the original sin of Marx, Weber, and their followers was to look for the 'origin,' 'cause,' 'nature,' 'mechanism,' indeed the 'essence' of it all essentially in European exceptionalism, instead of in the real world economy/system. (p. 336)

These examples indicate that the social theories produced by Western scholars, including Immanuel Wallerstein, are grounded in the European experience, which does not cover the experiences of other nations constituting the rest of the world. As a result, the one-world system that has been in existence and still continues to exist, as Frank argues, has been bypassed by Immanuel Wallerstein and other proponents of world system theory.

Third, I want to acknowledge that I also believe that there is one world system, and that Europe is part of that system. In addition, I believe that as the European states rose to the hegemonic position in this one-world system and as they ascended to the hegemonic position, the characteristics of the system gradually changed and the boundaries between the core and periphery states became clearer. These changes did not make the one-world system

European, nor do they generate a unique world system, as Wallerstein contends that a new, modern world system emerged at the turn of the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe. The hypothesis that there has always been one world system could be another thesis topic. Therefore, I am not going to discuss it further, since I chose to focus on the role of the Ottomans in the emergence of the modern world system, which is a continuation of *the one-world system*, as the advantage in the system shifted to Europe.

Having looked at the European-centered modern world system as a continuation of the one world system, I now want to finalize my discussion by presenting the ways the Ottomans' economic and political policies played important roles in the development of the modern world system. If we look at this role from an economic perspective, I have to mention that the trade that was taking place in the Ottoman domain was the most important contribution that the Ottomans made to the emergence of the modern world system. Being located at the center of trade routes between the West and East gave the Ottomans the opportunity to play this role, which they exploited to a great degree. The Ottoman policies towards mercantilism in their realm created a favorable environment for the burgeoning of the merchant classes that were mainly composed of Muslims, Armenians, and Jews, who brought the Western and Eastern worlds together as they traded in textiles, medicine, spices, arms, and many other goods. The Europeans found out about the exotic goods of the East as they continued doing business with the Ottoman merchants in the Mediterranean, Istanbul, Aleppo, Bursa, Izmir, Cairo, and other Ottoman port cities. Frank (1998) quoting Inalcik and Quataert, depicts this situation in the following way:

The Ottomans did indeed occupy a geographical and economic crossroads between Europe and Asia, and they sought to make the most of it. The east-west spice and silk



trade continued overland and by ship through Ottoman territory. Constantinople had developed as and lived off its role as a major north-south and east-west crossroads for a millennium since its Byzantium founding. That also made it attractive for conquest by the Ottomans, who renamed it Istanbul. With a population of 6000,000 to 750,000, Istanbul was by far the largest city in Europe and West Asia and nearly the largest in the world. (p. 78)

As the Europeans did business in the Mediterranean, which was considered an Ottoman lake, they developed mercantilist skills that helped them to extend their profits in the discovered lands of the North American continent. Many European companies that were doing business in the Mediterranean were at the same time involved in trade in the New World. In a similar way, a significant number of Britons who did not pursue their fortune in the army moved to different parts of the Ottoman Empire to benefit from flourishing business in the Ottoman realm, particularly in the Mediterranean. Nabil Matar (1999) describes this trend by saying that:

In 1597, Sir Anthony Shirley came into possession of Jamaica, but left it, sailed home, and from there ventured to the Levant and Persia. John Pory translated the work of Leo Africanus, one of the most influential and informative texts about North African Muslims in Renaissance England, and then went to Virginia and wrote about it; Sir Thomas Smythe was a founder of the Levant Company before becoming treasurer of the Virginia Company; four members of the Levant Company were also members of the Massachusetts Bay Company. (p. 97)

These examples clearly indicate that the European colonizers of the Americas were the very same people who were doing business in the Ottoman Mediterranean. The politics that the

Ottomans implemented in the Levant facilitated the accumulation of capital, which was a crucial process leading to the emergence of the modern world system. As a result, the seeds of capitalism that sprung out of Europe were planted in the Mediterranean, which is not surprising because of the long history of mercantilism between different nations that the Mediterranean linked together.

The introduction of the Ottomans into Europe changed a common, long historical trend that the Europeans followed to access the richness of the East. Up to this point, the Europeans rallied massive armies of crusaders to get to the richness of Eastern societies under the surreptitious ideology of securing Holy Churches located in the East. These crusading rides resulted in the demolition of infrastructures, pillaging, destruction of lands and peoples, and, other times, in ransack of the very same cities that crusaders aimed to save. Although the Ottomans put an end to this crusading, they did not cut off the European access to wealth in the East. On the contrary, as I have been arguing, they created different avenues that gave Europeans a legitimate way to obtain this wealth in a greater volume. These avenues could be grouped basically as “external” and “internal.” A good example of internal avenues would be the creation of foreign courts in the Ottomans' lands to solve disputes among the European merchants. The alliances between merchant nations, like Venice and the Ottomans, would be one example among many of external avenues' facilitating interaction between the West and the East. These examples are significant in terms of playing roles in the emergence of the world system because they were taking place during the very same time period, namely 1450 to 1650, that the modern world system was coming into existence, as Wallerstein argued incessantly in his studies.

Although Immanuel Wallerstein considers 1450 to 1650 to be “the long sixteenth century” and the most important century, he fails to give equal importance to all of the historical events, including the ones I have mentioned in the previous paragraph, that occurred during this time period and that played decisive roles in the emergence of modern world system (Zolberg 1981:255).

The Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power during this long century that Wallerstein takes as a departure point. The Ottomans could have closed the Mediterranean to the European mercantilist activities, but instead they extended the Mediterranean trade capacity by linking it to Eastern Asia, as they annexed Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. If we agree with Wallerstein that the modern world system’s parts were linked to each other by economy, then we cannot be oblivious to the link that the Ottomans were providing that through which the trade between Europe and Asia and Africa took place. Of course, this was not the only economic link that the Ottomans were providing, whether providing the link was done deliberately or because it came into existence as a result of the Ottomans’ expansion. The trade between Russia and Europe that was taking place through the Black Sea was also under Ottoman control, as the Ottomans terminated the Genoese presence there.

The famous Silk Road, which was a prominent ancient trade route between the West and East, remained intact during the Ottoman reign. A careful study of the Silk Road will reveal the contribution of the Ottomans to the emergence of the modern world system. However, this endeavor is beyond my expertise, so I chose to exclude the Silk Road’s role in my thesis since I believe that I have enough evidence to show how the Ottomans played important roles in the emergence of the modern world system.

The trade in the Levant was concentrated in the hands of the Ottomans to the extent that in order for the European states to do business here at a state level, it was quintessential that they acquire permission and protection from the Ottoman sultans. Otherwise, the European states had to pay large taxes in order to do business, which was not appealing to them, as the margin of profit decreased. During the reign of Sultan Suleiman (in reign from 1520 to 1566), the French enjoyed the privileges of doing trade in the Mediterranean best, since the Ottomans gave them capitulations both to divide the Christian nations of Europe and also to monopolize the trade in the Mediterranean. During this time period, other European nations engaged in trade under the French flag, including the first hegemonic power in Wallerstein's model, the Dutch Empire. The capitulations that were given to the French by Suleiman Magnificent had a decisive impact on the direction that the "European" modern world system took although they functioned against the interests of the Ottomans in later, centuries. But this reverse effect did not take place during the 'long sixteenth century', when the modern world system was coming into existence. As a result, I am not distorting the historical realities of the Ottoman Empire by not looking at the capitulations in the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, since I am not looking at this period of time. As a matter of fact, my discussion is in perfect line with Immanuel Wallerstein's, since he treats the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries as the most important time period in the emergence of the world system.

How did the Ottomans' political and military involvements with the Europeans create auspicious settings for some European states to rise in the world system? Although the Spanish and the Portuguese were the first European nations that started the discoveries, they were not placed into the core category by Immanuel Wallerstein. The Ottomans' confrontations with the Portuguese and the Spanish in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean,

and the European landscape debilitated their power to ascend to being core-like countries. Aside from this, the alliances between the Venetians and the Ottomans against the Spanish and the alliance between France and the Ottomans against the Spanish-Hungarian Empire changed the balance of power in Europe in favor of other European states, such as England, France, the Netherlands, and others.

The Ottomans' influence on the Europeans was prevalent to the extent that when the Europeans discovered the New World, they applied to the ideologies and stereotypes that they developed during their interactions with the Ottomans in different forms. That is to say that the Europeans legitimized their appropriation of the wealth and resources of the indigenous population by arguing that they were as barbarous as the Turks were. The Europeans were trying to understand the people of the Americas on the basis of their experiences with the Ottomans. This practice was not something new for the Europeans. In their crusading to the East, they applied these ideological terms, backed by the idea of the liberation of the Holy Lands from the Muslims, to gather enough support from their populations. Nevertheless, the underlying motive for the Europeans was to expropriate the wealth in the East, the prevalence and the amount of which, was beyond their imagination. Nabil Matar (1999) argues that sodomy was the basic justification for the Europeans in the conquest of Indian land and the appropriation of its gold. He provides the example of the debate between two Spanish intellectuals, Oviedo and Las Casas, that centered on debasing the culture of Indians in terms of the practice of sodomy. Wallerstein (2006:4) also mentions the argument between Las Casas and Sepulveda in his attempt to analyze how the Europeans used ideology over time to justify their colonization of the Americas by creating the categories of "others." Both Wallerstein and Matar, in their

discussion of how the Europeans justified their conquest of Americas, acknowledge that Las Casas did not agree with his fellow men that the native population was barbarous.

Nevertheless, the main belief among the colonizers was that the Indians were barbarous like the Ottomans were but that they were different from the Ottomans since they practiced sodomy, committing a crime against divine and natural law. Therefore, for the Europeans, it was a holy mission to Christianize the native population or to annihilate them.

What is the relevance of the discussion about how the Europeans used the different ideologies to legitimize their conquest of the Americas to the Ottomans' role in the emergence of the modern world system? First of all, it indicates that Europeans have good skills of using ideologies to suppress other peoples. Second, the different stigmas that Europeans create to define non-Europeans are sometimes accepted by those people partly as a result of intense usage of them and partly because of the power of rhetoric impacting the psychology of the people. As Wallerstein (2006) argues in his most recent book, the Europeans came up with different ideologies, such as barbarous people, civilizing missions, Christian evangelism, human rights, and scientific knowledge, to sustain their hegemony in such a modern world system. Third and most important, the Ottomans were the victims of this practice of the Europeans, since they were “the other” for them for centuries.

I believe that Wallerstein is part of this trend since he excludes the other civilizations' parts in the formation of the new world system by relegating them to the category of Empires, which supposedly were obstacles to the capitalist mode of production. As I pointed out before, Wallerstein and Faruk Tabak's article about the integration of the Ottomans in the world system in the 18<sup>th</sup> century does not reflect the dynamics that the Ottomans provided in this new formation at all. This particular time period was selected for the purpose of their

justification that the modern world system tends to diffuse over time until it incorporates all parts of the world. In other words, it is acceptable that the Ottomans were part of the Wallersteinian model as long as they were kept in the periphery category. However, it is still questionable whether the Ottomans were really part of their system during this century and the following one. The fact that the Turkish Republic has been trying to be part of the European Union for almost a half century but each time the Europeans come up with different pretexts for keeping Turkey outside Europe proves how difficult it is for the Turks to be part of any European systems. Ironically, there have already been millions of Turkish citizens living in Europe despite the efforts of the Europeans to keep them out. It is still not clear whether the Turkish Republic is going to join the European Union or not despite the fact that formal talks have begun between the two parties.

What happens when we place the Ottoman Empire into its proper place in the modern world system that emerged at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century? Why is the Ottoman Empire's role in the emergence of the world system important? If the Ottomans had not provided the different settings that I have been arguing throughout my study, would the modern world system still have emerged? Why have the contributions that the Ottomans made in the development of this system been ignored by the proponents of the modern world system theory? I will conclude my last chapter by answering these questions, which are important in providing a holistic reading of the socio-historical picture of the course of events leading to the formation of the world system. The true understanding of the Ottoman civilization and how the Europeans benefited from it will assist us in making better sense of the current global political, and military conflicts taking place in the geography that used to be part of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottomans' existence as a world power in struggle with the European core-like countries while the modern world system was coming into being suggests that we have two choices: either to accept the Ottomans as another core country with its own world independent and outside of the European world system or to accept the Ottomans as another core country within the modern world system. Placing the Ottomans into both categories will be accurate to a certain extent, but I argue that it is historically more correct to position them in the second category since the Ottoman Empire's policies linked the West and the East, thereby preparing a suitable political and economical environment for the emergence of the world system. During their expansion in Europe and other parts of the World, the Ottomans never stayed outside of political, socio-cultural, and economic developments taking place in Europe. The involvement of the Ottomans in the politics of Europe was intense to the extent that even during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the King of Poland had to be the Ottoman candidate but not the Austro-Hungarian one.

The acknowledgment of the role that the Ottomans played in the development of the modern world system is important since it will make it clear, as Frank argues, the Europeans did not ascend to the hegemonic position by "pulling themselves up with their own bootstraps," but rather they gained the advantage in the on-going world system (1998:334). Furthermore, such an acknowledgment will make the world system get rid of its Eurocentric character and make it *the modern world system*, which is the continuation of the one-world system to which other nations beside the European nation also made contributions.

If the Ottomans had not followed policies in favor of mercantilism in the Mediterranean, which facilitated the trade between the Europeans and Asians and Africans, the Europeans could have continued their decades' or centuries-old wars among themselves



and avoided developing trade further. If the Ottomans had not created alliances with some European states, like Venice and France, to enhance the economic and militaristic relations, the merchant class coming from these states and other European countries could not have prospered in their business. In return, these classes could not have transformed into capitalist classes, at least during the “long sixteenth century.” The establishment of the European courts in the Ottoman domain to facilitate and provide a safe environment for the European merchants further bolstered the trade between the West and the East. If the Ottomans had not expanded into Europe and provided the means for the Europeans to participate in the spice and textile trade network with Asia and North Africa, the Europeans could not have searched for alternative ways to monopolize this trade. Why the Europeans never tried to sail in the Atlantic, which is in their backyard, before 1492 remains a mystery. My answer is that it was a direct result of the Ottomans' expansion into Europe and their favors to the Europeans to do business with the East in greater volume than prior to the Ottomans' rise to world politics.

Finally, I do not know why the proponents of the modern world system ignored the role that the Ottomans played in the emergence of *the modern world system*. It could be because of their lack of knowledge of the Ottomans or it could be a deliberate choice to not include the Ottomans in the picture, rather to present everything from a Eurocentric perspective. However, as time progresses and more Ottoman archives become available, it will be even clearer that the Ottomans had a great impact on the emergence of *the modern world system*. Of course, credit should be given to the Europeans in succeeding in turning the advantage to their side in the one-world universal system and making most aspects of it less human.

## CONCLUSION

Having the Ottomans in the world system as contributors of the emergence of the system and as a core-like country makes the world system theory more accurate and encompassing. The Ottomans' strong political organization and regulation of trade in the Mediterranean basin, combined with their location at the crossroads of trade between the East and West from their emergence as world power until the modern world system took a definitive form, suggests that the Ottomans have to be placed in the world system theory as a core-like country or another hegemonic power. The fact that the Ottomans opened up different avenues for the European states to develop capitalism indicates that the Ottomans were active participants in the world system, possessing the characteristics ascribed to the core countries in the world system theory. If the Ottomans did not expand in Europe and follow politics in favor of the development of capitalism by facilitating the trade between the Europeans on the one hand and the Asians on the other, the world system could have not emerged in Europe at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

In this study I indicated that in order for the world system theory to live up to its claim that all parts of the world make one unit and that every part belongs to one specific category, then the Ottomans' position and the roles that they played in the emergence of the system have to be reevaluated. Accordingly, I provided a holistic picture of the world system theory by locating the Ottomans in their proper position in the system by presenting historical facts. However, further archival research is needed to find out how the Ottomans lost their world power character as the Dutch descended from the hegemonic position in the system, since the Ottomans' decline started during this time period. Furthermore, a study of the Chinese Empire during the emergence of the world system will illuminate the extent to which

the world system incorporated and impacted every nation the world. Or this study might reveal that, actually, the world system was not covering all parts of the world as it is argued and that it was something confined to Europe and its neighbors.

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