In this essay I will argue that Burkay Ozturk fails to adequately defend his negotiative theory of identity in his article, “The Negotiative Theory of Gender and Identity and the Limits of First- Person Authority.” I argue that the analogies he presents to support his theory and problematize first person authority fall short of doing so because there are significant differences between the cases he presents to elucidate intuitive acceptance or rejection of another’s self-identity. The aim of this essay is to elucidate disanalogies in Ozturk’s series of cases that could explain why the cases should be treated differently, address possible objections, and respond accordingly to demonstrate that the analogies between his cases do not hold. I will argue that the analogies between the cases do not hold due to differences in (1) the morality of actions taken, (2) the strength of the relation between each identity and the action, and (3) the harm caused to those with the same self-identification.
Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy: Vol. 7
, Article 8.
Available at: https://commons.emich.edu/ac/vol7/iss1/8