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The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer: A series of three individual essays

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The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer: A series of three individual essays

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The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer:

A Series of Three Individual Essays

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

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Schopenhauer's Early Theory of Will

Arthur Schopenhauer is renowned not only for his ideas on pessimism, but also for his theory of will, which is the topic of the current essay. I look to explain Schopenhauer's early theory of will as expounded in his *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* and *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* (*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*).¹ These two works are clear and to the point on Schopenhauer's early views on will, and serve as an adequate foundation for exploring his later, more mature doctrine of will (*Lehre des Willen*). First, I will give some preliminary remarks about his philosophy. Then, I will go through his dissertation, outlining the four expressions of his principle of sufficient reason (*Ausdrücke des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*), paying particular attention to causality and motivation.² Following that, I will go through his Prize Essay, paying careful attention to his notion of character and his allusions to the transcendental freedom of the will. Finally, I will expound some critical comments on the coherence and implications of his early system.

Preliminary remarks---

Schopenhauer, completely repulsed by the metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, particularly in their attempts to explain (and all previous attempts) how and why “Nothing is without a ground or reason as to why it is rather than not,”³ proposes to build a whole, revised epistemological system. The explanation of this question is essentially the

¹ I will refer to the former as his “Prize Essay,” as is customary. Additionally, I will refer to the latter simply as his dissertation.

² “*Satz*” is translated as “principle,” yet I note, it is also translatable as “statement, or sentence,” and is for Schopenhauer merely a way in which one can express the reasons or grounds on which “Nothing is without a ground or reason as to why it is rather than not” in words.

³ Dissertation, §5, p. 6.

expression of a principle, the knowledge of which will unite the links of a system. For he says, “But what else except the principle of sufficient reason unites the links of a system?⁴” Such a system would be inclusive of an explanation of everything we can know, do know, and how. It is this epistemological system that is the primary concern in Schopenhauer’s early works; the four expressions of the principle being the primary concern in his dissertation.

Schopenhauer differentiates between cause and ground for knowing. He rebukes Descartes and Aristotle for having conflated the two, and later goes on to quote Spinoza, particularly how he failed so badly in his *Monadologie* that he said the phrase *ratio seu causa*⁵ eight or so times on one page. Schopenhauer later gives an explanation of his own distinction between the two: “reason” or “ground” is that which answers, “why does (x) occur as a necessary consequent in the brain of a subject, i.e., as a representation?” It should be noted, of course, that representation is a key element of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and is a word translated from the German *Vorstellung*, to put in front of one’s self or to imagine; all definite knowledge is merely a mental representation or “picture” in the brain of the thinking subject, according to Schopenhauer. “Cause” is an affliction of one empirical state of a thing on another, immediately perceived by the thinking subject. Hence, *cause* refers to empirical phenomena exerting influences on one another outside of the thinking subject; *ground* or *reason* is how and why we know something within the subject.

⁴ Ibid., §4.

⁵ Ibid., §8, p. 20. “Cause or reason.”

The principle---

“Not authorities, however, but reasons are the philosopher’s weapons.”⁶ ~Schopenhauer

To elaborate more about the principle, its most general expression is found in the writings of Wolff, “*nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit*,” or, “Nothing is without a ground or reason as to why it is rather than is not.” The principle in question points out that there are certain ways in which we recognize and are cognizant of certain classes of objects. Additionally, each class functions by way of a certain faculty of the subject. Each of these faculties is called the “subjective correlate” of its respective class of objects. Likewise, the knower or perceiver of these objects is called the subject. All four of these faculties taken together are what Schopenhauer calls “the faculty of cognition.” Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is a principle that expresses how the thinking subject necessarily uses his understanding (object is causality), reason (object is the concept), pure intuition (object is being), and self-consciousness (object is will), or the four faculties of human cognition.⁷ The first class of these objects is similar to the Kantian phenomena; it is comprised of intuited data of the physical world through the *a priori* forms of pure sensibility, e.g., space and time. These data are the changes of states in matter, which comprise our understanding of causality.⁸

For Schopenhauer, each class of known objects warrants a special expression of his principle. In each of these expressions, there is the positing of a cause or ground, and in each circumstance, there is a necessary consequent. Schopenhauer says of necessity:

⁶ Prize Essay, p. 81.

⁷ “Schopenhauer later gives an explanation of the will’s transcendental freedom (Prize Essay, p. 86), where Schopenhauer thinks it is transcendent beyond any definite explanation of the principle of sufficient reason.

⁸ Note that Schopenhauer considers causality itself to be an *a priori* form of pure sensibility, in dissention from Kant’s original thinking.

The principle of sufficient reason in all its forms is the sole support and sole source of all necessity. For necessity has no true and clear meaning except that of the inevitability of the consequent with the positing of the ground.⁹

Hence, he has four expressions of the principle, and four classes of objects which are possible by way of the soundness of the principle. We begin with the first class of objects, those of *empirical intuition*.

First class of objects---

The first class of objects is that of “*intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical* representations,” or just empirically intuited objects.¹⁰ These objects and the process in which they are intuited and immediately understood in terms of causality is explained below.

Working from Kant’s principles of the transcendental aesthetic, Schopenhauer explains that everything outside of the thinking subject, or not “underneath the skin” is in a constant process of changes. His insight comes in his assertion that instead of bodies directly affecting one another with their own force, as Hume’s famous illustration with the billiard balls presumes, bodies of matter are merely the substratum in which change occurs.¹¹ Furthermore, change is the process of one state of an object (matter is synonymous with “substance,” and comprises all empirical objects) becoming responsible for the ensuing state of matter in itself or another. According to Schopenhauer, causality is properly understood when the mind (brain) of the subject empirically intuits these changes of states. This perception is done “immediately,” a point

⁹ Dissertation, §49, p. 225.

¹⁰ Ibid., §17, p. 45.

¹¹ Schopenhauer’s affinity to Locke in this respect is not coincidental; he frequently cites references to Locke’s *Essay on the Human Understanding* and his notions of substrata and the correspondence between the qualities of objects and mnemonic impression in the subject.

he is persistent on, and criticizes Kant for imagining that causal understanding is attained only indirectly through a paralogistic analysis, or rather, through categorical understanding which first requires the process of imagination. In an immediate apprehension of those changes of states which happen outside of the subject, the understanding necessarily posits a cause to the observed phenomenon, the understanding of which constitutes what Schopenhauer calls *empirical intuition*.¹² This understanding is possible *a priori*, or prior to all sensuous experience; that is, the understanding will formulate this transcendental notion of a cause within matter for every and any potential experience.

Thus, Schopenhauer calls the expression of the principle for this class of objects, “*principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*,” or “principle of sufficient reason of becoming.” This is a fitting expression, for it unequivocally illustrates that changes of states of objects are being intuited, and not mere objects. Furthermore, it is important to know what it is that correlates the objects in every class to the brain of the subject, or that which lies “under the skin.” Schopenhauer calls this the “subjective correlate” and in the first class of objects here explained, the subjective correlate is the understanding, which is essentially the same thing as the faculty of this class of objects, as already mentioned.

I will now give an illustration of how this notion of causal understanding is supposed to function in the mind of the subject. For example, let us say that I see a car accident on the street in front of me. One car is damaged. Immediately, my eyes gather data of the spatial state of the material body; this is all that can be accomplished in my body, that is, with only my eyes.

However, with the *immediate* aid of my understanding, I am able to empirically intuit otherwise

¹² This is to be distinguished from what he calls “pure intuition,” which is expressed under another form of his principle. Furthermore, I have omitted Payne’s translation of “perception,” since it adds nothing to a description of the process of intuition.

meaningless data and postulate a cause of these states *a priori*. The postulation is not simply that body a) causes body b) to be wrecked; on the contrary, my postulation is an immediate understanding that certain conditions of states of surrounding objects (material bodies) contributed to the currently observed state.¹³ For example, the slipperiness of the road, the speed of the cars, how much pressure had been collectively building in the atmosphere, etc., are all changing states of things which contributed to the effected state; and these conditions and changes are considered a cause.¹⁴ In this fashion, the objects of the understanding are the changes in the empirically intuited matter, and that which correlates them (or allows them to be represented in the brain) is the understanding, here explained with an emphasis on its perception of *causality*. Hence, the above gives us a good explanation of the states of causality.

A few things should now be said about the details of the process of empirical intuition, namely, more about the *a priori* forms of sensibility, and the possibility of perceiving what Schopenhauer call change and coexistence. First of all, Schopenhauer keeps Kant's *a priori* forms of sensibility, i.e., space and time as two "windows" through which empirical intuition takes place.¹⁵ Schopenhauer says in his dissertation, §18, page 42, "The forms of these representations are those of the inner and outer senses, namely *time* and *space*, but only as *filled*

¹³ Care must be taken in describing anything in the process of empirical intuition as "observation." Schopenhauer does not believe this mere act to be possible in anyone who possesses the ability to use the principle of sufficient reason. However, "observation" is a good term to describe a hypothetically isolated step in the process of empirical intuition. It refers solely to the impression of data from outside the subject upon the eyes.

¹⁴ They are considered as such somewhat conglomerately. Schopenhauer calls the dominant causal state, if identifiable, the *κατ' ἐξοχην*, or "according to prominence," "*par excellence*," etc.

¹⁵ "A priori form of sensibility" is a term I have taken from Coppleston's explanation of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. In a Schopenhauerian context, it refers to the transcendently necessary "windows" of time, space, and causality in able to comprise the immediate understanding.

are they *perceivable*. Their *perceivability* is *matter*...”¹⁶ He explains further that the coexistence of any two objects is possible only by way of both space and time; for if there were only time, then there would be nowhere for another thing to exist simultaneously.¹⁷ For example, *if* anything existed at one moment (It would also have to be without body, or extension, and Schopenhauer does not take this to be a possible process within empirical intuition.), it could not be compared to anything else at that same time without thinking about it by means of space, i.e., by means of juxtaposition of two things *in* space. To further illustrate, Schopenhauer makes the converse claim that if there were only the *a priori* form of sensibility of space, then there would be no perceivable change. He says, “... for alteration or change is *succession* of states, and succession is possible only in *time*.”¹⁸ Therefore, in order that change be intuited, the *a priori* form of sensibility of time is also necessary; both space and time are retained from Kant’s philosophy as fundamental tools of the understanding. And yet the Schopenhauerian understanding is immediate, and requires yet another *a priori* form of intuition: causality, which has been explained in the example above.

I will give a final example that Schopenhauer uses to illustrate our causal, spatial, temporal, and immediate understanding.¹⁹ When I turn my head on its side, for example, I do not seem to perceive that the world has turned on its side. Actually, I still recognize everything as being right-side-up. This takes no analysis to understand; it is an immediate adjustment of how I understand the data fed into my eyes (sensibility, immediately aided by the understanding).

¹⁶ By “perceivably,” Schopenhauer means “intuitable.” Also, by “filled,” Schopenhauer means “complete,” (i.e., a representation in the understanding which is filled in actual space; and so it has body in the real world.), and calls it such on page 46. However, the term (“complete”) does not recur as necessary language in the dissertation.

¹⁷ Dissertation, § 18, p. 46.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, §18, p.46

¹⁹ All understanding is necessarily spacial, temporal, causal, and immediate, but this example will emphasize the claimed immediacy of the understanding.

Second class---

Now I will explain Schopenhauer's next class of objects, that of abstract concepts. By using the understanding's material from empirical intuition, the faculty of reason (*Vernunft*) is able to formulate abstract concepts and signify these concepts with words and language. Accordingly, language is the medium through which the faculty of reason is able to conceptualize individual experiences.²⁰ On the faculty of reason, Schopenhauer says this is a "...very special cognitive faculty belonging exclusively to man, is based on the fact that he has a class of representations not shared by any animal."²¹ Schopenhauer calls this expression of the principle, "*principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*," or principle of sufficient reason of knowing. We can certainly infer from that reason is a "special" faculty that what is referred to in the Prize Essay as the "faculty of cognition" is indeed the general faculty of human intelligence, viz., cognition. This inference stands as important, in that we realize that the faculty of reason is one species of the faculty of cognition, which is the genus.

Indeed, forming (abstracting) and manipulating (reflecting) abstract concepts turns out to be a vital aspect of Schopenhauer's epistemology. He defines concepts as, "representations from representations," and repeatedly mentions that they contain a breadth of material and knowledge far beyond any individually intuited cause.²² Also, he describes them as being a genus- as such, they are general, and without much empirical content, i.e., empirically intuited content. The higher the concept, the more general, and subsequently the "poorer" it becomes. The faculty of

²⁰ Schopenhauer calls the formulation of concepts "abstraction," although the actual German is unknown to me. Similarly, the intellect using these concepts is called "reflection." See his Dissertation, §27.

²¹ Ibid., § 26, p.145

²² Ibid., §26, p.146.

reason “apprehends” many empirically intuited experiences, and from them forms an outline of sorts: a concept.²³ As such, the faculty of reason is the subjective correlate of this second class, in that it correlates empirical intuition to concepts in the brain of the subject.

Accordingly, Schopenhauer maintains that without concepts, no knowledge is possible; we can therefore say that concepts are transcendently argued for. He quotes Aristotle as saying, “For without the universal, knowledge is impossible (*Metaphysics, XII, c.9.*)” Schopenhauer also maintains that concepts are capable of excluding considerations of time and space as *a priori* forms of sensibility, and can therefore think beyond the limits of time.²⁴ However, one must differentiate between an example of a concept (empirically intuited cause or set of causes) and the concept itself (general set of outlines of what has been experienced by the subject). Hence, all empirical intuition serves as the raw material of concepts, although much of the detail of this material is lost in the formation of the more general concept.

We now move to explore the *judgment*, the four types of truth of the second class of objects, and its expression of the principle. First then, Schopenhauer says that a judgment is “...a combining or separating of two or more concepts under various restrictions...,” or basically a way in which concepts are related to each other and empirical intuition as forms of knowledge. This relationship is actually a *grounding* of the concepts existence, or the necessary truth as to why it is rather than is not.²⁵ When this concept in the brain of the subject is (and it must necessarily be so) grounded in one of the four classes of truth, it then is called *true*. Additionally,

²³ §26. This merely signifies a transition of empirical intuition to being represented as concepts, or general outlines of many experiences. While this process is not physiologically explained in detail, there is little doubt that the brain (synonymous to the mind for Schopenhauer) is able to do it.

²⁴ §28, p. 154

²⁵ This is entirely different from cause, which is strictly limited to empirical intuition and the understanding.

it can be called a true consequent of a ground of knowledge.²⁶ With this claim Schopenhauer wants to establish four different kinds of conceptual truths, or grounds of knowledge. Again, language is the medium of concepts, and concepts are the material of knowledge, based originally on the representations formed from empirical intuition. And so he wants there to be four sorts of concepts, all of which are true or grounded in four different ways, that is, they are necessarily the way that they are rather than not because of four different ways in which they are grounded, or have reason to exist in a certain way, hence in a certain class (one of the four).

To clarify, Schopenhauer says that a judgment is true under any one of the following four conditions. When any of these four conditions is met by a concept, i.e., when a concept is grounded in any one of these four ways, it is categorized into one of four classes of truth. For example, the first condition is when a concept is grounded in another concept; hence, this sort of judgment (necessary grounding) is called formal or logical, and constitutes what he calls *logical truth*. The second condition constitutes what he calls *empirical truth*, and this is when a concept is grounded directly in the representations formed from empirical intuition. The third condition is when a concept is grounded in *a priori* forms of pure sensibility, or “...the conditions for the possibility of all experience...,” and Schopenhauer calls a judgment that meets this criterion one of *transcendental truth*.²⁷ The fourth and final condition is when a concept is grounded in “the formal conditions of all thought which lie within our faculty of reason,” or basically, four formal rules of rational thought.²⁸ A judgment that meets this condition is called a *metalogical judgment*. Thus, I have summarized the judgment and each of the four classes of true judgments.

Finally, a quick overview of the *principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*.

²⁶ Schopenhauer later mentions “ground of knowledge and consequent” in his Dissertation, §36, p. 195.

²⁷ Ibid., § 32, p. 160

²⁸ Ibid., §32, p. 161

On the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, Schopenhauer says the following:

As such, it asserts that, if a judgment is to express a piece of *knowledge*, it must have a sufficient ground or reason; by virtue of this quality, it then receives the predicate *true*. Truth is therefore the reference of a judgment to something different therefrom. This something is called the ground or reason of the judgment and, as we will see, itself admits of a considerable variety of classes. But as it is always something on which the judgment is supported or rests, the German word *Grund* is suitably chosen.²⁹

So, this is basically a summation of what has already been discussed, namely, how a concept is grounded, expressed by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, and classified into constituting a true judgment.

Third class---

“Habe Mut dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! Ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.”³⁰ ~Kant

“Have courage to use your own reason! Thus is the motto of the enlightenment”

The expression of the principle for the third class of objects is *principium rationis sufficientis essendi*, or “principle of sufficient reason of being,” and this class of objects is called that of *pure intuition*.³¹ Essentially, this is where the *a priori* forms of space and time diverge from pure sensibility, and their “infinite extension and divisibility” become the objects of pure intuition. According to Schopenhauer, this is a distinct class and the relations of being (ex., the three sides of an equilateral triangle, § 15) such as “above and below, front and back, first and last” are not knowable by any other means than that of pure intuition.

²⁹ Ibid., §29, p.156

³⁰ “Have courage to use your own reason! Thus is the motto of the enlightenment.” From, *An Answer to the Question, What is Enlightenment?*

³¹ Dissertation, §35, 36. p. 193, 194.

Schopenhauer gives three subcategories of the objects of pure intuition, and they are: Ground or Reason of Being in Space (§37), Ground or Reason of Being in Time: Arithmetic (§38), and Geometry (§39). In §37, Schopenhauer comes to the conclusion that every being in space (any object or representation, such as a line, circle, or hypotenuse of a triangle, for example) is grounded in every other one. Thus, there is an infinite regress or infinite reciprocity of grounding one thing to another in space, *ad infinitum*. This means that so far as the subject can consider the existence or being (always relative to his operations according to the principle of sufficient reason) of any geometrical object in space, its position is relative to the position of any other potential object. The position of this object is important in considering the grounds of its being, because the definition of the object's existence, e.g., how it exists as a fixed line or collection of points in space in relation to other points, which can be considered in space, is entirely relational and relative to the position of other points. If we simplify the consideration to the existence of a hypothetical point in space, we come to ask ourselves, "In what is the existence of this point grounded?" The answer, as Schopenhauer provides it, is that the existence of our hypothetical point is by definition positional- but positional to what? The existence or being of the point is necessarily relative to the position of another point in space, and this could be anywhere in space. Therefore, if the subject is to consider the existence of one single point, he must consider the position of the point to be the extent of its existence. As for the grounding of the existence of this point, since its existence is positional, its existence is relative and positional to another point in space, or any other, *ad infinitum*; this is what Schopenhauer means when he says the grounding of the being of one object in space is grounded in the being of another. One point is necessarily relative to another, and another, and that one to another's, etc. The same applies to lines and shapes in space; for example, the existence of one line is grounded

in the existence of every other potential line (although thinking about two lines simultaneously and merely by means of space is impossible, since coexistence requires time, as discussed above), since it extends infinitely in two directions and must eventually contact another potential line relative and in relation to its direction and position. This means that the diametric line of a circle necessarily exists in spatial relation to any other diametric line which is formable within the circumference of the same circle.

In § 38 and 39, on arithmetic and geometry, respectively, Schopenhauer explains how geometrical and algebraic axioms are pure intuitions. The demonstration following from such axioms, say, Euclid's demonstration of equilateral triangles (Fig.3 in the Dissertation), where "If in a triangle two angles are equal, the sides subtending them are also equal," even if the length of the sides is multiplied or divided, is nothing more than the necessary consequent of being (of equilateral sides, for example) of the purely intuited axiom. In arithmetic, demonstrations are done solely in consideration of time. In geometry, merely by space.³² However, I maintain that these claims are not possibly sound, taken together, since geometry must have coexistence, and hence both space and time, as we have clearly discussed. Perhaps these axioms and demonstrations could be united in the concept of matter and hence be entirely conceptual, rather than "purely intuited." Accordingly, these *a priori* considerations would be entirely within the faculty of reason, and it is hard to imagine why Schopenhauer makes an additional class of objects for them. Regardless, he maintains that all geometrical and arithmetic demonstration works in this way. Schopenhauer also says that this method of demonstration, more akin to *elenchus*, gives way to no new insight.³³

³² Dissertation, §47, p.224.

³³ Ibid., §39, p. 200. *Elenchus* is a term used in different ways. In Schopenhauer's dissertation, it is said to be a syllogism demonstrating the contradictory of a proposition, a refutation. I have also heard it used to describe the

Fourth class---

“Ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν εἶδος εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.”

“The understanding is the form of forms, and sensibility the form of the senses.”³⁴

With the preceding sections out of the way, we can move into the final and most interesting class of representations, which are governed by the principle, *principium rationis sufficientis agendi*, or simply, “law of motivation.” This law essentially states that some representations and judgments are “...produced by an act of will which has a motive.”³⁵

Copleston provides a good explanation of the object of the fourth class by saying that the sole object of this class is the acting subject, or in Schopenhauer’s words, “the subject of willing considered as object for the knowing subject.”³⁶ This just means that the willing subject is being considered, and the ground of his willing is called a *motive*. By willing, Schopenhauer means immediate self inflicted action, but the relationship between action, character, and motives is not discussed in his dissertation, but rather, he refers to his *Prize Essay*, which is what will be discussed next, in order to better explain motivation and the subjective correlate of self-consciousness.

early Socratic method written Plato, where Socrates elicits a definition (of Justice from Thrasymachus, for example, in the *Republic*, although this is actually a later work), and then proceeds to refute it without a fully constructive solution.

³⁴ Dissertation, §41, p. 210. A very philosophical statement.

³⁵ Ibid., §44, p. 216. I must point out that Schopenhauer has already precluded the possibility of a judgment which lacks a necessary and determining ground by the faculty of reason. Therefore, speaking of a “judgment that that does not follow its previously existing ground or reason” is quite meaningless. However, he still says this explicitly in his explanation of the law of motivation. The only sensible possibility I can think of is that Schopenhauer meant something else, and the translation was fuddled in some way or another.

³⁶ See Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 30 (listed in the bibliography).

The *Prize Essay*---

I. Definitions

Schopenhauer says early on that "...a free will would be one that is determined by nothing at all," essentially setting up the parameters of a free will which will here be considered as relevant. It can be stated in the proposition *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, or "free choice of indifference." He also has a discussion of exactly how freedom can be defined, but for our purposes, non determined will is a sufficient criterion for a free will. The first (later condemned by Schopenhauer as errant) proposition of the freedom of the will is stated as, "I can do what I will." This proposition comes from what he calls the immediate self-consciousness, which is discussed next.

II. The will before self-consciousness

The aforementioned proposition, "I can do what I will" is said to be in the immediate self-consciousness of every subject. In fact, its demonstrability and certainty (for example, I can lift my arm, *when I will*) are nothing more than that; in other words, this proposition tells us nothing about the actual freedom or determination of the will. In ch.2, Schopenhauer tells us that self-consciousness is, "The consciousness of our *own self* in contrast to the consciousness of *other things*."³⁷ This self-consciousness is immediate, and becomes aware of itself "as one who wills." Since self-consciousness is completely internal, it has no knowledge of external objects, or, in short, any of the other three modes of cognition, i.e., empirical intuition, reflection, and pure intuition. In terms of willing then, the self consciousness is aware of its ability to will. It is not aware in the least as to whether or not it (the subject of self consciousness) is actually free in *what* it wills. He says, "I can will, and when I will an action, the movable limbs of my body will

³⁷ Prize Essay, p. 8.

at once and inevitably carry it out the moment I will it. In short, this is equivalent to saying that ‘*I can do what I will.*’³⁸ But this does not mean that self-consciousness also asserts that “I am free to will what I will.” For this would assert the freedom of the will itself, as opposed to the freedom of the subject to do something in *accordance with this will*.³⁹ The question now becomes one of how and to what extent, if at all, the internal will is determined by the outward motives toward which it aims (through bodily action, i.e., with the hands or feet, or mnemonic action, i.e., with the brain of the subject, although either action would be unrecognizable to the self-consciousness of the subject, since it is only aware that it is a subject that can do what it wills, not if the will itself is free).

To answer this question, Schopenhauer makes a distinction between wishing and willing. A *wish* is when the process of will is coming about, but to *will* is an exclusive, singular decision to take an action. For example, any subject is able to wish several and even contradictory, mutually exclusive things at any given time. However, he is only able to make a decision or act of will regarding one of them, at one exclusive time (he cannot will two things at once). Hence, Schopenhauer is easily able to refute the proposition of the common man, that is, “...in a given case, opposite acts of will are possible...” an errant conclusion based off of the immediate yet inadequate knowledge of the self-consciousness.

From what has been gathered so far, it is clear from the expression of self-consciousness that the subject can do what he wills, and so in this way his actions are dependant on his will alone (i.e., not on any external influence). We can therefore say that acts of will are grounded by the individuated will itself (the individual will of the subject). Yet what Schopenhauer really wants to know is on what grounds a particular or individuated will is dependant, if any.

³⁸ Prize Essay, p. 14.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

Before he does this, however, he makes a couple comments on the subjective consciousness, a part of which is the immediate self-consciousness. On the subjective consciousness in its totality, that is, with all four classes of knowledge, he says that all our scientific achievements are made by it when it uses its faculties to analyze the outside world of objects. The application of these faculties to the outside world includes the achievements of logic, natural science, and language, etc. Yet on the inner world of the subjective consciousness, he says, "...but *inside* it is dark, like a well blackened telescope. No principle *a priori* illuminates the night of its own interior; these lighthouses shine only outward."⁴⁰ Hence, there are no a priori principles that guide us to knowledge of the inward workings of our own total subjective consciousness or immediate self-consciousness. Instead, its faculties are designed to build knowledge about the outside world. And so to answer the above question, "On what ground(s) is a particular will dependent," he subjects the question to the perspective of the consciousness of other things (external objects).

III The will before the consciousness of other things

Schopenhauer begins by summarizing the universality and central importance of the law of causality, or *principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*. He says, "We now approach this experience itself with our universal, *a priori* certain rule, which is therefore valid without exception for all possible experience, and consider the real objects given in experience..." Accordingly, he posits the grounds for the will in animals (humans included, only as more sophisticated species) as being motives. This ground of motivation stands in contrast to the "lower" ground of plant behavior, namely, *stimulus*. For illustration, one can imagine a plant, entirely devoid of self-consciousness as being able to grow toward direction a) or direction b).

⁴⁰ Prize Essay, p. 19.

However, the determinate (ground for the consequent behavior, or growth,) will be how much light comes in on an average day from direction a) vs. direction b), etc, and this light is called one of many stimuli. It is easy to see from this example how similar stimulation and causality are for Schopenhauer. In animal species, however, there is the immediate self-consciousness; this creates a new terminology: will and motive.

“When a human being wills, he wills something; his act of will is always directed to an object and is conceivable only in reference to such.” This object is called a *motive*. Furthermore, Schopenhauer claims that the manifestations of willing include all emotions of attraction and repugnance, in all degrees, in short, all the passions: love, hate, fear, anger, etc. All passions are “...definite affections of the same will that is active in decisions and actions.”⁴¹ In other words, through every action there is an affection on the will; and so the will is either appeased or abhorred, “...satisfied or unsatisfied, impeded or allowed its way.” This is comparable to the way in which a plant is determined to grow; indeed, Schopenhauer thinks our acts of will are determined by motives, just as states of objects are affected by one another, plants by stimuli, geometrical demonstrations by axioms, etc. He says, “On the assumption of the freedom of the will, every human action would be an inexplicable miracle- an effect without a cause.”⁴² This statement is of course referring to acts of will grounded in a motive. In short, his view of human action and everything else has been completely deterministic up to this point.

He defines “will” as the force behind our actions, and compares it to the unknown forces of nature, which manifest themselves in electrical activity, gravitational patterns, etc (physiological design is a latter development of his more mature theory of the manifestations of

⁴¹ Prize Essay, p.10.

⁴² Ibid., p.40

the will). These forces are otherwise known as “gravity,” energy, polarity, etc. As such, will is “inexplicable,” and not knowable a priori but rather, “only through experience.”⁴³

Yet it is still possible for two different people to react differently in identical situations. To explain how, Schopenhauer posits his theory of *character*. He says of character, “Like the forces of nature, this character is also original, unalterable, and inexplicable.”⁴⁴ He says it is *individual, empirical, constant, and inborn*. Individual means that it is different in every subject; if the consequent act of will is to be predicted of any given subject, the individual nature of his character must also be know. Of course, this is a seeming impossibility, given what Schopenhauer says above regarding the complete inexplicability of character. Character is empirical in that it is recognized solely through experience. According to Schopenhauer, this is why we are often surprised when the test of making a decision comes before, we often do not act as bravely or nobly as we had predicted. Because, namely, we require the actual experience in order to learn the qualities of our character. Character is constant in that it is unalterable; and it is inborn in that one is stuck with it, the way it is, from birth and so on. Schopenhauer tries to support this claim by giving examples of people whose decisions (reflecting an assumed quality of character) seemingly never change, but his evidence is somewhat lacking, given the immensity of his claims of the inborn, unalterable quality of individual character. Hence, character is supposed to be that thing which accounts for why and how different individuals are able to react differently to the same motive.

Schopenhauer says that if a subject’s character and motive are given in a situation, his will is inevitably affected, and a consequent act of will must ensue.⁴⁵ However, each

⁴³ Prize Essay, p. 42.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 42

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

individuated will is affected differently, that is, emotively, by the acts of will it performs (it either likes or dislikes them). Furthermore, the real ground of an act of will is not the Will itself, but rather the *motive*, represented in the faculty of cognition (literally, “placed in front of” cognition, or *vorgestellt*). So, a given subject uses some faculty or another (probably reason) to represent a *motive* to himself, and with this motive, he immediately acts toward it. The representation of the motive to himself is accomplished within his faculty of reason (as an example of a concept), and his immediate self action and how his will feels thereafter are accomplished in his *immediate self-consciousness*.

Schopenhauer says quite clearly, “The character is the empirically known, constant, and unalterable disposition of an individuated will...”⁴⁶ This does **not** mean that the will is affected or determined by character, but rather, emotionally predisposed to like some acts of will better than others, within the immediate self-consciousness. However, to what extent an individuated will is emotionally predisposed is still not clear, and neither is the faculty in which one’s character is supposed to lie (Note, however, the quality of a given character does not exempt the subject from moral approbation, as one must then condemn the acting subject for having deficiencies in his inborn and unchanging character, or rather, having been born).⁴⁷ As far as allowing for variety in acts of will between two subjects, an example is given below.

Here is an example. Subject a) and subject b) are in two adjacent rooms, unable to see one another. Both think they are in a waiting room, waiting to see a lab director or some medical sort about an experiment they have both volunteered to participate in. What they do not know is that their character is actually being tested while they wait. In both rooms, a wallet lies under a stool on the floor. It appears to be abandoned, and several hundred dollars are visible coming out

⁴⁶ Prize Essay. 85.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 85. On moral approbation, see Prize Essay, pgs 83-84.

of its middle. Subject a) picks up the wallet and pockets the money, but doesn't want the actual leather wallet, so he is careful not to leave any prints on it and slyly puts it back under the stool. Subject b) on the other hand, takes the wallet and goes to the receptionist desk and rings the bell, so that he can report the wallet as lost. The difference is one of character: the qualities of subject a)'s character are supposed to be comprised so as that his will is pleased by taking the money. Conversely, subject b) reasons and imagines that returning the wallet to its former owner is innately good, and that performing this act is the right thing to do, in other words, his duty, and that doing the opposite would be wrong, perhaps even sinful.⁴⁸ This in turn is a reflection of his character, or predisposition of his will to avoid "stealing" because it makes him feel bad, ashamed, guilty, etc. In this case, *fear* actually becomes the operative motive, as I see it, and this is a fear of feeling bad (an emotional affection of the will).⁴⁹

Yet we must not shirk from this obvious mistake: the place and ground of character are not mentioned in the *Prize Essay*. If it is supposed to be inborn, indeed, is to have functions within some undisclosed faculty of cognition, it must have a ground. Furthermore, we should be informed as to how much of an influence it has on our individuated will, and how such a will, which affects nothing, is itself affected by both a) character and b) acts of will. One is reminded of Schopenhauer's unending insistence on the soundness and necessity of his law of causality,

⁴⁸ This example is my own original creation, but puts the transcendental explanation of character into the moralistic context in which Schopenhauer explains it. See *Prize Essay*, pgs 50-55. The attempted explanation of how character works is my own, since one can not be found in the *Prize Essay*. Also, see Kierkegaard, Soren. *Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?* Nineteenth Century Philosophy, Baird, Forrest E., and Kaufman, Walter. Prentice Hall, 2001. The latter provides famous questions about ethical values, in particular, on whether they are established via reason or absurdity.

⁴⁹ It is my contention that all willing is in a sense fear-driven, or at least operant, and not blind as Schopenhauer maintained. However, the explanation of how fear operates in the supposedly "moral" considerations of subject b) is more fitting than that of subject a).

yet where is it to be found with regard to character, or, as we will see in a bit, with regard to the will eternal itself? We will keep these questions in mind as indicating problem areas in the coherence of Schopenhauer's early system.

V Conclusion and higher view

We now move on to examine Schopenhauer's concluding remarks on the freedom of the will. Schopenhauer eventually characterizes the existence of man as having both *empirical necessity* and *transcendental freedom*. By empirical necessity, he means every deterministic proposition in the existence of the subject hitherto expounded. By transcendental freedom, he means the will as a *Ding an sich*, the noumenal "source" of the intelligible manifestations within the faculty of cognition. These manifestations are expressible within the principle of sufficient reason, and recognizable through any of the four classes or faculties of the subject (one such faculty, reason, postulates matter, and hence the physical body, which is also a manifestation). The will, transcendental to all manifestation, is beyond considerations of space, time, and causality. As such, it is entirely free.⁵⁰ Furthermore, it is "abstracted" "...from the appearance and all its forms in order to arrive at that which, outside all time, is to be thought of as the inner essence of the human being in himself."⁵¹ He says also that, "Consequently, the *will* is indeed free, but only in itself and outside the appearance." He therefore concludes that the *essence* (essence, noumena) is free, and the *operari* (action) is determined. Hence, freedom of the will is in itself, and nowhere to be found anywhere in the faculty of cognition, tightly run by the principle of sufficient reason, nor in the actions of man.

As a final conclusion to what has been said, it must be added that Schopenhauer gives little to no argument as to how we can prove, "abstract," or demonstrate this noumenal will. He

⁵⁰ Prize Essay, p. 86.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

runs into the problem of proposing *something* that is necessarily precluded from all human knowledge. Moreover, he even proposes to assign it functions and dispositions and qualities and other such vanities, when its entire existence must be called into doubt. While Schopenhauer's analogies of will to forces of nature are slightly appeasing, there is not much detail we can ascertain from such analogies. Such analogies are in fact nothing more than that famous cave allegory of Plato, where the Ideal is "apprehended," yet beyond its corresponding, transient, uncertain physical counterparts. Schopenhauer wants instead a transcendental argument- but for this one needs reasons, and reasons are *knowable* reasons. Yet he tries to construct a transcendental argument for a transcendently free will, when there is absolutely no demonstrable ground or reason for its existence. In this early system, one can not distinguish between an argument for the *transcendent* freedom of the will via analogy, and a transcendental argument, since the transcendental is reduced to the transcendent, when such an argument proposes something unknowable as a "necessary" ground.

In conclusion, a good and thorough explication of Schopenhauer's early theory of will has been expounded. Critical comments have been included all along the paper, and a final critique of his failed attempt at a transcendental argument for the freedom of the will has even been included. The continuation of this study will result in explicating Schopenhauer's mature theory of will, with the intention to find more argumentative support for his key notion of a transcendental will. As this early theory of will has proven to be mostly epistemological in nature, it is expected that the later theory of will might be much more metaphysical, and this is looked forward to. Additional comments will be added in the mature theory of will, as seen fit.

Arthur Schopenhauer: Platonic Tenets of his System and the Failure of their Implementation

In this essay, I will show how Schopenhauer's attempt to use Platonic forms in his matured theory of will creates serious problems for his system. We will see how, although producing notable iconoclasm and originality in western philosophy, Schopenhauer's thinking nonetheless becomes entangled with some of the traditional problems in metaphysics and life ethics, eventually appealing to traditional elements in Platonism as attempted solutions to his system's problems. Salient among the internal problems of Schopenhauer's own system, and consistent within his own philosophical terms, is the failure of his attempt to use Platonic Ideas as a quasi-medium in order to bridge the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. The failure of this attempt then jeopardizes the establishment of his ethic of the renunciation of the will to live, and consequently imposes some serious questions on the method he uses for his system's establishment.

In the end we will see that, amidst all Schopenhauer's circumlocutive scholiums, linguistic erudition, and learned discourse, there exists a strong, traditional Platonic nature and method to his system building, the use of which does not strengthen the viability of his system, but weakens it.

Rather than defining my terms out of their proper context, it is better that we go directly to Schopenhauer's main work, *The World as Will and Representation*, so that I can elucidate his claims, method, and the consequent problems of his matured philosophical system. The object of this essay is argumentative more so than explicative, and so all explication will be useful only in so far as it is expository toward the main argument and objectives stated above.

We begin with some preliminary remarks about Schopenhauer's system. First, Schopenhauer divides the world into two basic realities: phenomenal and noumenal.⁵² The phenomenal world is what is known to us scientifically and through the principle of sufficient reason. The necessity by which everything is governed by this principle is the work of his early theory of will, and in this work the mind is divided into four cooperating faculties of cognition, i.e., causality (comprised of the *a priori* forms for the possibility for all experience, and unified and experienced in the representation of matter), reason, being, and motivation. As it stands, I have moved earlier to unify reason and being, the second of the four faculties as adduced in Schopenhauer's *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, and objected to his statements on geometry and arithmetic; yet these objections are in this essay moot. The noumenal world, on the other hand, is the *Ding an sich*, or thing in itself, in other words, the necessary condition for the possibility of mind, perception, causality, or anything within the consciousness of the subject. There is only one ultimate ground, as Schopenhauer claims, and this is the transcendental will.⁵³ It is defined as the ground of every representation and force of nature, its own nature being a "blind striving" and endlessly deficient, aimless existence, this striving being the will to live.⁵⁴ For Schopenhauer, the transcendental will is the thing in itself.

Now one condition Schopenhauer establishes is that the mind can not posit itself as object of will, that is, according to the principle of sufficient reason. He does of course think it is possible to posit the mind as the manifestation of will, but whether we could still call this an "object" is under question, although he does call our bodies objects of will, and so we can suppose he would extend the same nomenclature to the mind. Furthermore, I find it questionable in which sense one posits the mind as objectification of will, that is, "how can this be done with

⁵² This draws from Kant's prior distinction between the two worlds.

⁵³ Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, pg 86, 87.

⁵⁴ Schopenhauer calls the will-to-live the innermost nature of the world itself. II, 350

knowledge, when knowledge has no bearing on the noumenal world?” In other words, we cannot posit the mind as object of a noumenon according to the principle of sufficient reason, because the principle of sufficient reason is valid only for the phenomenal world, or the world of representation. The most likely answer of Schopenhauer would be that through feeling and our experience of our bodies as immediate object (the primary objectification of will in which we experience sensuous reality, and the first objectification of the will through which knowledge is made possible, *via* the brain), we are granted an extra insight into the noumenal thing-in-itself. Ultimately, this insight depends on a “realization” of the Platonic Idea(s), which is the alleged method of art, and the meaning of which is the object of philosophy. We shall speak of these Ideas later.

There is also an ambiguity as to whether a ground is a knowable object. What little Schopenhauer says of this seems to indicate that he regards grounds, as everything in the phenomenal world, as *objects*. While this may be a dissention from later phenomenology, Schopenhauer thinks in general that the world perceived *via* representation is nothing but a conglomerate of related representations, able to be surveyed by man by the use of his *reason*. He says, “...but what else could a ground be, but an object...?” To extend this position in his favor, a ground for say, a judgment would be the perceived experience of causality, and this perceived instance of causality is itself very conceivable under a general concept.

The concept, which Schopenhauer develops more thoroughly in his main work than previously, is abstracted from the perception of an instance of causality into a general rule or concept. In other words, general concepts are built in an inductive manner, but not merely from observations of experiences, but through the principle of sufficient reason, and this principle regulates how the *a priori perception* of raw experience is formed into a general concept. The

content of concepts does not include all of the content of experience, but rather is formed in a way in which reason can call any particularly *a priori* perceived instance of experience from any concept that was formed from it. The perception of an everyday object, for example, is grounded in how the principle of sufficient reason imposes itself on the mind of the subject.

Everything so far has served as a brief outline of some of the key tenets in Schopenhauer's philosophy, along with a couple of questions. However, we cannot progress to a discussion of the Ideas by recapitulating; we must go straight to a discussion of the Platonic Ideas, bearing what has already been said in mind.

The paramount item to understanding the problems of Schopenhauer's use of the Ideas is a thorough description of the Ideas as Schopenhauer sees them. Simply put, they are the essences of every particular phenomenal manifestation of the will.⁵⁵ The Platonic Idea is something which is an immediate reflection of the thing-in-itself, i.e., will, and Schopenhauer calls it the "...therefore adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself..." Somewhat paradoxically, he goes on in that very sentence to say, "...the will in so far as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become representation." We gather from this description that the Idea, its total nature yet to be revealed, lies somewhere between the transcendental will and the world of phenomena.

In fact, Schopenhauer says that the Idea is a "being-object-for-a-subject," and I will explain, with his own quotations, what he means by this.⁵⁶ He thinks that the Idea is the primary,

⁵⁵ Schopenhauer also thinks phenomena are manifestations of forces of nature, i.e., of the will. This is an interesting insight, particularly with its implications on the incompleteness of modern scientific understanding, particularly its heuristic limitation short of the *qualitas occulta* (hidden quality). Yet the insight remains nonessential to his system as a whole. See I, pgs. 80-81, 97.

⁵⁶ The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I, pg. 175. I will refer to this simply as I, and to the second volume as II. Both volumes are listed in the bibliography.

most universal objectivity of the will.⁵⁷ This instantiates another division of terms and notions in Schopenhauer's whole system. Just like two sides of a coin, Schopenhauer divides reality into the noumenal world and the "ideal" or "medial" world, the world of Platonic Ideas.⁵⁸ The entire will as thing-in-itself has a completely mirror reflection of itself: the medial world, where the whole objectivity of the will as Platonic Idea lies. In turn, reality is further divided into the phenomenal world, in which objectification takes place. Additionally, the most universal reflection of the will is its yet unobjectified objectivity, the Idea; this is essentially the medial world between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds (refer to figure I).

As for the nomenclature "being-object-for-a-subject," subject, as we know, refers to the transcendently possible process of an object being perceived. In other words, the subject is what perceives any object, and we know in phenomenology that this is how object perception is ostensibly possible. However, there is yet another division between individuated and non-individuated subject, because Schopenhauer insists that objects are perceived by individuated subjects, while the Idea is apprehended only by "non-individuated" subject.⁵⁹ Again, as we know, every manifestation of the will is necessarily posited by the mind as object, and this is done by subject (mind). The mind itself is contingent upon the ultimate ground of will.⁶⁰ But insofar as the thing in itself is objectified into the phenomenal world, and therefore subject to the principle of sufficient reason, i.e., knowledge, it can only be perceived by an individuated

⁵⁷ The reason that the Idea is not a "manifestation" or "objectification" of the will *per se* is because every objectification is represented to the individuated subject through knowledge, hence, through the governing laws of the principle of sufficient reason. Every objectification is therefore individuated, i.e. particular, in that it is represented to an individual subject at a specific time (and therefore subject to causality), and in that it is a reflection of a more universal Idea. Therefore, we should take care to distinguish the term "objectification" from "objectivity."

⁵⁸ I invented the terms "medial" and "Ideal world." Schopenhauer does not use them, but instead speaks only of the Ideas. I call it medial because it lies between the will and phenomenal worlds.

⁵⁹ This is supposedly the pure form of "subject," as the most general subject possible as the Idea is the pure form of "object." Unfortunately, neither is knowable (or at least knowable in any useful sense, as I will explain later), being beyond the grasp of the principle of sufficient reason.

⁶⁰ We have a difficulty in calling the will a "ground," since Schopenhauer says it is not a cause of phenomena, but that phenomena are a representation of it. See I, p. 140.

subject. Insofar as the thing in itself is mirrored in the medial world as its objectivity, it can only be apprehended by the non-individuated subject. This division forces us to ask, “Why can’t the individuated subject perceive the Idea?” The answer is that the Idea is a mirror reflection of the will as objectivity, not objectification. The individuated subject can perceive only individuated objects of knowledge- subject to space, time, and causality- and since the Platonic Idea is universal, not individuated, the individuated subject cannot perceive it. Schopenhauer explicitly says that the principle of sufficient reason “has no meaning...” to the Platonic Ideas.⁶¹ Thus, the Platonic Idea(s) are beyond “valid” knowledge, assuming that such knowledge must be established and grounded by the principle of sufficient reason.⁶² We see then from this how the Idea is medial and lies between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, and also how it is beyond the individuated subject. What I will describe now is the role which the Ideas play in Schopenhauer’s system.

Schopenhauer begins to speak about Ideas which are more or less perfect than one another, and I will explain his notion of the “higher” Idea and its role.⁶³ “This higher Idea subdues all the less perfect phenomena previously existing, yet in such a way that it allows their essential nature to continue in a subordinate manner, since it takes up into itself an analogue of them.” He means to imply here (and states explicitly elsewhere) that there are Ideas independent of the principle of sufficient reason which become manifest as particular objects such as plants and animals. What he means (and does not clearly explain) by the term “perfect” is what I aim to explain. As in Plato, an Idea is the essence which reflects itself in various degrees and gradations

⁶¹ I, p. 169.

⁶² Schopenhauer maintains that there are a variety of Platonic Ideas beyond individual knowledge.

⁶³ I, pgs. 144-145.

as physical reifications of itself.⁶⁴ For Schopenhauer, physical objects are reifications of the will to live, its direct “mirror image” is the Idea, and physical objects are reflections of Ideas. Since the will as thing in itself is the transcendental ground for all phenomenal manifestation, we can take it to be complete within itself. This simply means that we cannot consider it to have any deficiencies, i.e., it is simply what it is. Any particular object, on the other hand, will represent only a particularity of the will at a certain time, and in a certain point in space, and additionally to an individuated subject, grasping the manifestation with the particular means of his body at a certain time, etc. Phenomena can therefore be seen as incomplete reflections of the thing in itself. Considering that our word “perfect” comes from the Latin *perfectus*, meaning “complete,” it is no surprise that Schopenhauer, or at least Schopenhauer in translation, would consider phenomena that represent more of the will than others to be more complete and therefore more perfect than others. By more perfect, Schopenhauer merely means more completely manifesting the will as thing in itself, which is of course a blind striving and the will to exist.

For example, the will strives to exist, and we see this as its general *modus operandi*; the will’s complete mirror reflection is the Platonic Idea, and this in turn is separated into many Ideas, which have everyday objects as their representation.⁶⁵ Now if the will is a blind striving to exist, as Schopenhauer says, it should have the Idea of existence as its core reflection.⁶⁶ This Idea in turn furnishes itself into two Ideas, one an Idea of the existence of, say, a plant, and another of a frog. Both Ideas will manifest themselves to the individuated subject through the laws of the principle of sufficient reason, appearing in space, time, and causality, but in order that we may understand the example, we have to understand the Ideas’ objectification completely. By this I

⁶⁴ In Plato, *e.g.*, *Meno*, mathematical thinking is also supposed to reflect knowledge of the Forms via recollection, but Schopenhauer classifies mathematical knowledge as subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason.

⁶⁵ I will have to comment on this aspect of the Ideas a little later.

⁶⁶ It does not, however, have the Idea of existence as the core tenet of its reflection. Working hypothetically, I will assume that it does, so that I may give the rest of the example.

mean that we only have to look at the characteristics and behaviors of the two objects, plant and frog, in order to see how one more completely objectifies our Platonic Idea of existence. The plant, needing only to passively receive light for photosynthesis, absorb water, and adapt at most some sort of camouflage or poison to prevent being eaten by predators, exemplifies many aspects of living which are inseparably bound up with the larger notion of existence: it uses energy, consumes space, water, and to a slight degree adapts to its environment, all of which are survival strategies which we view as being under the general heading “existence: plant: how to.” A frog, on the other hand, does much more than our particular plant- it developed organs as more sophisticated means of sustaining itself, partly through vision, touch, smell, and taste. It developed articulate digits so that it can position itself on most any terrain, large leg muscles so that it can jump away from predators in a moment’s notice, a camouflage skin to hide itself among plants or trees, pheromones to emit so that it can attract a mate and propagate. All this it is likely to do in its lifetime, and we can view each adaptation to its environment, suited to the prolongation of its survival, as a phenomenon exemplifying particular aspects of the Idea of the frog’s existence, as odd as that may sound. The Idea of the frog’s existence is more perfect than the Idea of the plant’s existence, because the frog exists more completely than the plant, i.e., it is an objectification of more of the faculties used to prolong existence, the sole urge of the will as thing in itself. The “lower” Ideas which the frog (the Idea of the frog’s existence objectified) subdues, yet allows to continue in a “subordinate manner” is the objectified Idea of the plant, since the frog uses the plant for its own existence as a natural camouflaging environment, the habitat of its insect food, etc. Thus, the plant has its own existence, while the frog incorporates the existence of the plant, while building a more complete existence upon it.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Schopenhauer says the hierarchy of the complexity and completeness of living organisms has “definite grades of

It is of course obvious that there are a number of problems with the above scenario, and I hope to show how they constitute real logistic problems for Schopenhauer's system as a whole. The first problem I want to address is not the most severe of the problems, but is rather a sort of symptom of the main problem already alluded to. Schopenhauer's notion of "perfection," or "completeness" assumes that any objectification of the will as will-to-live has to be subdued by a more perfect Idea. The human race, for example, certainly has subdued, in its own opinion anyway, all other races. But it has not subdued the forces of nature which still baffle and even occasionally scatter us. This does not destroy Schopenhauer's claim that the human race is the summit of the objectivity of the will-to-live, but it does make us question how the design or hierarchy of "higher Ideas" is structured, and what the structural criteria are. There was a similar problem faced by the doctrinal theory of the "great chain of being" and its proponents in medieval Europe, in that there always lay a difficulty in establishing, according to somewhat naïve rules and criteria, a hierarchy of the perfection of all the creatures of the earth.⁶⁸

The biggest problem with Schopenhauer's system is the proposed role of the Platonic Ideas. There is a twofold problem: first, the Ideas are in some way to make the thing in itself more knowable to the subject, via the medial world, although this is impossible according to Schopenhauer's own terms, and secondly, The Ideas are supposed to reflect a mirror image of the thing in itself, whose properties are completely unknowable, and therefore we cannot tell whether there should be one or many Ideas, nor what they should be exactly.

its (will's) objectivity..." He also notes that the human race is the pinnacle of the will as will-to-live, since it subdues all other life forms under it. "Thus the will-to-live generally feasts on itself, and in different forms its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as manufactured for its own use." I, p. 147.

⁶⁸ Of course, the standard of perfection was different for medieval scholars, the more perfect organisms being closer to God.

Clearly, if we concede that the will as thing in itself is a “blind impulse,” an irrational, lawless urge that when objectified becomes the will-to-live, we must imagine that the will as thing in itself is either of uniform or multifarious aspect.⁶⁹ In other words, we have to ask ourselves, given Schopenhauer’s claims, as to what the character of the thing in itself is, and whether it has many, one, or any “properties” at all. Of course, Schopenhauer’s answer is that the will is somehow knowable, yet absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge itself. Knowledge is individuated and particular, as I have described already, so anything transcendental or Ideal (a Platonic Idea) is necessarily beyond the scope of human knowledge. This is precisely because Ideas, the thing in itself, and the *qualitas occulta* are not subject to the laws of the principle of sufficient reason, and likewise non-individuated. How then are we to tell how many Idea(s) should reflect the will? What are they reflecting? How are they reflected? How can we really know the nature of the will if it is completely outside valid knowledge, if not by some strange intuition, or more likely, tautologous presupposition? These questions remain unanswered. Likewise, if we don’t have a method of understanding how many Ideas there are or what they should be, we are unable to ascertain which phenomenon belongs to which Idea, and vice versa. The fact is, Schopenhauer fails to give a sound way of grounding the knowledge of the Ideas, the thing in itself, even the *qualitas occulta*, because he himself considers them to be outside the bounds of knowledge, which is individuated. It is therefore *impossible* for us to know in any certain way, that is, according to the principle of sufficient reason, the content of the thing in itself or of the Platonic Ideas.⁷⁰


⁶⁹ He calls it a “blind impulse,” see I, p. 285.

⁷⁰ Likewise, one is forced to question what the content of the non-individuated subject is, or how we can attain useful information about it, since it does not operate under any laws about which we can have knowledge. Also, any sort of “realization” it could attain of the Ideas in the medial world would equate as knowledge to the individuated subject, since such a realization would be made outside the bounds of his particular knowledge. In essence, it is impossible for the medial and phenomenal worlds to have any transference of knowledge from one world to the

An individual wishing to renounce the will-to-live is faced with a serious problem. He is unable, as an individual, to know anything about the will as thing in itself or the Idea(s) which reflect it. He is unable to *know* an Idea; he therefore cannot make any grounded assertions about it (or them). What Schopenhauer does say is that an individual can “realize” the Platonic Idea by ascending to be, albeit temporarily, a non-individuated subject. The obvious question is, what good does this do the individuated subject, since he still cannot know anything about this Idea he has just ascended to realize? If, as Schopenhauer claims, this ascension may lead us to a sort of renunciation or assertion of the will-to-live, we must sincerely believe his words when he says he does not want ...” to prescribe or recommend the one or the other...,” since there is no knowledgeable ground for either. We may thus suspect that Schopenhauer lays his notions of the renunciation of the will to live, the nature of the thing in itself, and the content of the Platonic Ideas according to wishes which are proscribed by his earlier admissions, namely, that everything knowable has to have a ground and be within the principle of sufficient reason. His subsequent notion of the non-individuated via “realization” of the Platonic Idea would be more credible if these Ideas were in turn knowable to any extent.

other. Subsequently, it is in the same way and for the same reasons impossible for the non-individuated and individuated subjects to have a transference of knowledge between themselves, the medial world and realizations of the non-individuated subject not really qualifying as modes of knowledge at all. The non-individuated subject and medial world therefore have no epistemological value to us who seek reasons and knowledge.

Figure I



* As a reference above, I have provided the figure below as a brief illustration of the main tenets of Schopenhauer’s transcendental system of will.⁷¹

Again, the phenomenal world of objects, which Schopenhauer emphasized so much as being certainly grounded in scientific knowledge, are the only things knowable by the individuated subject. The medial and noumenal worlds are unknowable via the principle of sufficient reason, and therefore any assertions about their content are unreliable, even if made through induction, as the product of a lifetime of experience, since knowledge cannot make reliable claims as to the content which lies outside its own boundaries. This is exactly the case with the medial and noumenal worlds.

I want to say in conclusion that I hope to have given a good summation of Schopenhauer’s description of the Platonic Ideas, their role, and the failure of their

⁷¹ Schopenhauer never makes it clear as to whether the *qualitas occulta* is actually a Platonic Idea. Therefore, I have treated it as a separate thing from the Ideas, i.e., as a force of nature. Schopenhauer very well may have maintained that the forces of nature are indeed Ideas. However, the little he says as to the content of the Ideas is essentially of an aesthetic nature, e.g., pertaining to his notion of the “beautiful.”

implementation, especially in its attempt to somehow bring the content of the will closer to individuated knowledge. The result of this failure is that we are forced to question the validity of any statements made about the content of anything outside the phenomenal world, including the establishment of any denial of the will-to-live.

Time, Spontaneity, and Will

The first thing I would like to do in this essay is to explain and elucidate what I call the phenomenological standpoint, and particularly Schopenhauer's expression of it. I will also argue that Schopenhauer shows how reason and logic are very useful, even in a unique philosophical system which is the expression of the standpoint. As we will see, Schopenhauer's key phenomenological notions like the conditioning of the world by the subject, already familiar to the reader, will play a central role in constituting his expression of phenomenology. Another thing I aim to do in this essay is show how Schopenhauer's system is philosophically viable, and by this I mean viable in its own right, and not merely as the work of a "transition philosopher."

His main work begins with the words, "The world is my representation," and this means in the strongest sense that the "world" is to every subject his own representation of it. This is in terms of the individuated subject, and what is perceived by him is the object; not because, as some may claim, the subject receives impressions of real physical objects and reasons that they are objective or have essential being external to him.⁷² On the contrary, Schopenhauer explains with success that there is an instant (immediate) perception of the physical world as necessarily provided for by the *a priori* forms of pure sensibility, time, space, and causality. This means that the subject automatically conditions its understanding *a priori* of any potential object before even receiving sensory data. This is the phenomenological standpoint, and it is argued for transcendently.

⁷² The individuated subject is the perception of objects as filtered through the principle of sufficient reason, as illustrated in the previous essay. The body of the individuated subject is phenomenal, appearing in time and space and subject to causality. Hence, Schopenhauer calls the perception of particular objects, and the particular phenomena associated with it (body) the individuated subject. In this paper, only the individuated subject will be considered for the purposes of argument. As for why I exclude the non-individuated subject from the current discussion, see the previous essay, pgs. 32-34.

The transcendental argument, central to the establishment of the phenomenological standpoint, proceeds to postulate what is necessary as a ground or reason for the possibility of the existence of mind or perception. In other words, it asks the bold question, “On what grounds is the subject able to exist?” The solution to this problematic question is not a grounding in God or thinking substance like the modern philosophers such as Descartes thought, but rather in the thing-in-itself. While Kant retained God as a thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer dissents by precluding the possibility of God as a thing-in-itself, since there is no objective representation to indicate his existence. Furthermore, in the phenomenal sense of the world (as objectification of the will, or thing in itself), Schopenhauer clearly states that the necessary forms for the possibility of all perception are time, space, and causality, which we will come back to later in the paper.

One ramification of the establishment of Schopenhauer’s transcendental argument is the principle of sufficient reason. The proper method of all scientific investigation and the only sure means to attain certain, scientific knowledge, the principle of sufficient reason governs all of the thing-in-itself’s objectifications in the phenomenal world. This means that the individual subject conditions his entire understanding of the world according to this principle and its four expressions, one according to each faculty of perception or cognition. With time, space, and causality, the opportunity for the mind to perceive actual data is opened, and the object can be represented to the subject both immediately and abstractly.⁷³ The key aspect here is that of the *representation*. That an object is a representation means that it cannot exist or even be conceivable without the subject (as Berkley also thought). However, it is conceived in relation to

⁷³ “Immediate” is a word used repeatedly by Schopenhauer. On the one hand, it means “instant,” in that the individual subject instantly conditions perceived events in time and space according to the first expression of the principle of sufficient reason, via causality. The second sense of the word indicates the most primal and fundamental individuated objectification of the Will, the body. The body is called the immediate objectification because it is the first necessary objectification for the formation of individual representations, which occur in the brain of the individuated subject. This is not true of the non-individuated subject, which was discussed in the previous essay.

the subject's *a priori* forms of pure sensibility (time, space, and causality), and it is the addition of these necessary grounds of cognition that distinguish Kant and Schopenhauer from Berkley.

The subject, with the knowledge that an object is representation, knows that this object necessarily is perceived and is therefore understood to exist only in so far as it is perceived by this subject. In this way one is reminded of Kierkegaard's cry that "subjectivity is truth." We see in a sense that every object is relative to the understanding of the subject. I will now move on to explain in more detail how objects are involved in making the phenomenological standpoint.

First, a phenomenal "object" is merely representational, and therefore its grounding for existence is not really objective, but rather *perceptive*, as is the subject's understanding of it. This is the basic standpoint of all phenomenology, and is only possible transcendently, i.e., *a priori*. Additionally, in that an object's content (as opposed to its form, perceived *a priori*) is *a posteriori*, it is accidental. The form of the object, on the other hand, is not accidental but rather necessary for its possibility of existence; the three forms I speak of are also known as the *a priori* forms of pure sensibility. So, the being of an object is grounded in the forms of the understanding of the subject.

In this move to the standpoint of phenomenology and the transcendental, the philosophical mindset of what an object is has been put into terms concerned more with the object's perception and less with its being, except as grounded in the *a priori* forms. Therefore, it is nearly meaningless to talk about or consider objects in a phenomenological argument as having independent being; since their grounds for existence (its possibility) are relative to perception itself.

On the other hand, Schopenhauer goes to great lengths to demonstrate how the forms and faculties of our knowledge are necessarily so, i.e., the *a priori* forms and subjective correlate of

each faculty governed by the principle of sufficient reason. In the sense that every faculty of phenomenal knowledge is necessarily so and the same for the possibility of each type of object for every individual subject, every faculty of phenomenal knowledge is universal. The three forms of *a priori* sensibility are also necessary, standard transcendental forms for the possibility of cognition in every subject, and are also universal in this sense. This simply means that the mode and method of understanding is unilaterally identical for every subject. For example, the faculty (understanding, reason, being, and motive) or subjective correlate of every object of knowledge is necessarily so. This is how the transcendental argument shows itself in the phenomenal world, as the principle of sufficient reason and grounds of the four faculties of perception.

I will now explain, within the terms and standpoint already understood, the extent to which Schopenhauer considers the practicality of objects, their mnemonic retention, and logic, accomplished by the faculty of reason.

With the faculty of reason, Schopenhauer maintains that it is possible for the subject to form concepts of experience based from the representations formed from empirical intuition. This possibility is of course reliant on space, time, and causality. From empirical intuition (understanding of causality and causal events in space and time, i.e., matter) the subject uses the *judgment* as a way in which to form a general rule or principle which contains each individually empirically intuited representation as an instance or particular expression of this general rule. Concepts are then formulaic rules derived from experience, which do not retain the particulars of experience. However, from every concept, a particular instance of it in causality can be drawn out. For example, the concept of Dog is formed by the faculty of reason from representations the subject makes with the understanding of causality, space, and time; from this general concept or

rule a particular representational instance of a dog can be drawn out or cited as an exemplification of this concept. Any particular dog would fit as an expression of a concept, depending on how (according to which qualities are perceived as doglike) and from which experiences this concept is drawn out.⁷⁴

The use of the concept is an important aspect of Schopenhauer's system and particularly in this essay. This is because the concept functions primarily to enable the subject to easily survey all of its representations (the world as represented to oneself) and from there become conscious of motives. As Schopenhauer says, reason is able to reflect beyond the restriction of past, present, or future, or is able in other words to look into the past and future. While reason is always only active in the present, as we shall discuss later, it is able to imagine or set in front of the subject that which is desired or aimed toward. This thing, considered as object, is called *motive* , and has already been discussed in the first essay. Again, Concepts function as general rules and guides for organizing and manipulating all of the experience perceived by the subject hitherto; this organization and manipulation is necessary for any of the subject's considerations of the future or past, and is called reflection. As the concept functions as a general guide, it is never (according to Schopenhauer) precise or detailed, and therefore is easier to reflect upon. A good illustration of the use of the concept is illustrated by imagining a circle. This circle represents the bounds of the application of a term (equivocal to a concept, as Schopenhauer tells us). Every concept being the equivalent of its linguistic symbol, Schopenhauer says language is the conceptual medium we use to communicate and concepts and reflect upon them. A general term then, which represents a concept, is vague and entails examples that might be included in

⁷⁴ There are four universal and necessary ways in which concepts are formed, the one being explained being the most fundamental and the basis for all the others. Schopenhauer seems to concede that individual subjects can form different concepts based on the same experience (in one of the four basic ways), thus allowing for the merely nominative nature of the concept.

another concept. The two circles of the term's application then overlap, due to the fact that the boundaries of each term and concept were never strictly defined. For example, concepts like "hot" and "cold" would be good examples of terms which represent abstracted concepts. The two terms actually overlap in how they are seen in the world; hence, their applications for the subject overlap. If a stone is warm, for example, it is then abstracted as the area of overlap between two concepts of "hot" and "cold" being applied to the object. Degrees of temperature being infinitely divisible, like matter and time, each concept which signifies an instance of temperature necessarily has an overlapping application with another of a slighter or greater degree.⁷⁵ In the same way, the application of most concepts overlaps with some others.

The nature of each concept is nominal. As I have already mentioned, there is no phenomenal object independent of the perception of the subject. Therefore, to the extent that a representation is considered to have an existence to the subject, the concept is formed and retained by the subject as characteristic of this existence, this concept itself usually being based on many representations formed from experience. As I have also shown, the concept is considered only in so far as it is useful or applicable for symbolizing many empirically intuited instances of experience. Since the use of the concept is nothing more than practical, it should not be considered epistemologically as anything else other than a nominal function of the mind for the subject's own convenience.⁷⁶ Finally, the presentation of motives to and for the subject is accomplished through the function of concepts, their medium being symbolic terms of language,

⁷⁵ This area raises some interesting considerations. If a term is equivocal to a concept, and a concept is a general rule, devoid of specific content, then how does Schopenhauer account for specific language and specialized terminology? I think that while Schopenhauer thinks language is the medium of concepts, he should also admit it to be the medium of Being (third class of representations), and furthermore unify the second and third faculties.

⁷⁶ If we consider the concept as a method of survival (i.e., serving the urge of the will), the concept and the mnemonic retention of it by the subject is an exemplification of the will-to-live. Therefore, the concept has a much different role transcendentally than it does epistemologically.

and this presentation takes past, present, and future perceived experience into account for its deliberations.⁷⁷

Now practical reason, governed as the second faculty of cognition under the principle of sufficient reason which governs all scientific knowledge, makes use of concepts, and their existence is not independent of the subject; they are nominal and pragmatic. Keeping this in mind, let me say a few words on how Schopenhauer's theory of reason, the practicality of objects, and the notion of motivation marks his thinking as truly philosophical in its own right.

Reason is and always has been not only the tool for giving argumentative reasons or grounds for a philosophical or (as Schopenhauer considers it) Scientific argument, but it is also a practical tool for examining motives and goals. While the ultimate meaning of this function must be examined as a philosophical issue, that is, to the extent that reason is the tool for surveying motives to the subject, its necessity remains; reason, a vital faculty of the phenomenological (or any) mind, is necessary for the organization of the world, and this includes the organization and survey of motives to the subject, whether conscious or unconscious.

Methodology is in general a great concern for anyone who studies philosophy or earnestly poses philosophical questions; we could say that a philosopher's methodology is what really marks him as a thinker. We have a great opportunity to shed some light on the originality of Schopenhauer's theory of time and existence, key notions within his general methodology or standpoint which mark his thinking as having lasting innovation in the annals of western philosophy.

⁷⁷ Whether or not language is really the medium of concepts or what the specific relationship between language and representation is remains unimportant here. The point is that Schopenhauer speaks of reason and conceptual thinking as being vital, practical tools for surveying past, present, and future, in order to attain specific things and goals, i.e., motives.

Regardless of the employed method, philosophical investigation is unilaterally the same in two respects if not among many other things: the *how* and the *why*. How is mind possible? How is science possible? Why act certain ways or think about certain things? Why value anything more than another? Why is the effect of an idea more important than its principles or conception? These are questions which personify, in a sense and to a limited degree, the root concerns of what all philosophical inquiry shares: the concern of how and why. A question of “what” is often raised, and the being of this “what” and its nature become the root of ontological discussions. Yet why and how are concerns more so exemplified in the systems following the phenomenological standpoint, since these systems attempt to explain our understanding of “why” and the possibility of (how) mind. My above claims about the concern of philosophical investigation, that it is always at least concerned in some way with explaining how or what, serve to show that a philosophy without at least these basic concerns *filosofe/ o)uk o)no/mati e)sti/n*.⁷⁸

I hope to have shown how the phenomenological standpoint addresses the how and why as regards the mind and possibility of experience, as well as to have illustrated the effectiveness and practicality of Schopenhauer’s concept. Schopenhauer’s methodology is rooted in the standpoint that resists considering any phenomena as independent from the subject, but rather always as an object for a subject. Within this standpoint also lies a promising method of exploring how and why man perceives the world, while Schopenhauer additionally provides a fascinating account of time and existence, which I shall interpret and describe below. This will show how he provides a method (phenomenological system) that is viably philosophical and exemplifies the practicality of reason.

⁷⁸ “Is not philosophy by name.”

Time and existence---

For Schopenhauer, being or existence of the subject is considerable only in so far as it is the individuated manifestation of the will.⁷⁹ This manifestation occurs in the physical world as well as in the mental world. Mental perception (reason, being, motivation) is possible only with a brain to use it, and so we have to consider mental perception and bodily objectification as two aspects of the individuated objectification of the will. In this sense, the subject has both a mind and a body; in terms of body, the brain is where mental thinking takes place. It is not true to say of Schopenhauer that mind and brain must be divorced or mutually excluded from one another. On the contrary, Schopenhauer maintains that the eyes and brain are tools of perceiving and surviving for any organism, and thus the organism gets along in the physical world. However, in terms of accounting for the possibility of understanding experience, the brain is said to operate under certain rules and using certain forms of perception. So, the human brain is that which has at its disposal the most advanced faculties of perception and abstracting, while other and simpler modes of perception are available to lower brain types, like those of animals (their perception lacks abstract reason). As individual manifestation of the will, the brain and its perception are two aspects of the individuated subject; in terms of this subject's perception, all else is subordinate to it. This means that even though the subject can be said to exist as object (having body, extension or brain), nothing can be recognized as object, indeed, the distinction not even made, if not for the phenomenological condition of the subject and object. Likewise, since all knowledge is subject to the laws of the principle of sufficient reason, all knowledge and

⁷⁹ Again, I mean here the actual and real existence of the individuated subject, not the Idea of it. In that the individual subject has a mind and body, he is alive. In that he is alive, he is said to exist. We must therefore divorce Schopenhauer's consideration of real, individual existence of the individuated subject from his separate consideration of the Idea of subject. In other words, the Platonic Ideas are separate metaphysical entities that are irrelevant to the discussion or consideration of what objectified existence is for the individuated subject.

perception of it is particular, i.e., appearing in a particular time, place, and under certain causes. The perception of phenomenal knowledge thus *is* the mental process of the individuated subject: his knowledge of all objects in the world, including its knowledge of its representation of his brain and body to itself, necessarily operates under the familiar rules and classes of perception already outlined.⁸⁰ In this way everything is subordinated to the subject, or in other words, everything is subordinate to his perception of it as object.

This having been said, *life* is the condition of all being. Each actual, individual existence and each individual subjective perception is objectified in part as living bodies or organs. Schopenhauer goes a step further and maintains that life and the present are inseparable. Thus, all real life and living things exist in the present, and not in the past or future. Our ability to recall the past and project into the future is accomplished by the faculty of reason, and from this and all the material of our perceived experience we are able to formulate and represent motives to ourselves. This presentation of a motive to oneself is possible only in the present, the individuated subject being a living, physical entity (considered in terms of his objective body).


Accordingly, real existence (the life of the body) is always in the present. Schopenhauer claims that past and future are not reified forms of existence, but rather, they are concepts. So, past alone is not a temporal criterion of existence, and neither is future; the body lives only in the present moment, while the mind projects its thoughts and motives into both past and future- yet these are like phantasms without objective reification. We could therefore say that past and future are somewhat imaginary, or at least representational, in that they do not have real objectification, in other words, they are concepts of moments that are void of actual objective

⁸⁰ I have personified the perception of the individuated subject by using the pronoun “him” as an equivocation. Although the mind (process of perception) and body (conglomeration of physical objects associated with certain perceptive processes, i.e., individuated subjects, of the will) are different aspects of the subject, Schopenhauer would treat them both as stemming from the will as thing in itself.

material. As objectification of the will, the subject becomes the objectification of the will to live in the present. Hence the subject's existence is inexorably bound to the present.

Schopenhauer says to compare time to "... an endlessly revolving sphere; the half that is always sinking would be the past, and the half that is always rising would be the future; but at the top, the indivisible point that touches the tangent would be the extensionless present."

Figure 2



Here is an illustration of Schopenhauer's diagram. The circle spins clockwise, the tangent always remaining vertical. The circumference of the circle is the never-ending chain of causality in time, and the vertical tangent of the circle represents the position of the existence of the subject in time. Each dot on the circumference of the circle represents a physical event in time *or* a physical motive toward which the subject aims and strives.

The label "subject" represents the phenomenological perception of the subject within the framework of time. And time, being a framework in which the subject perceives all events becomes an existential criterion, and that means that the subject does not merely represent

objects to himself through the a priori pure form of sensibility of time, but rather, comes to need time as a framework in which to understand his existence and role in the world.

Furthermore, the perspective of the subject is always carried out from the standpoint of his body, and so he is said to be objectified by the will in the present. Now this is the perspective of the subject in time- indivisibly between that which has been objectified and that which will be objectified, whether it be motive or event in time. Yet the actual objectification occurs only in the present. In terms of existence, the objectification occurs as subject and his body; i.e., as life.

Now spontaneity as non-determinate free will is impossible in this system, as every motive under the faculty of reason is what determines the individual actions of the subject. Spontaneity as a general non-determinism is also not scientifically possible, according to Schopenhauer, as every instance in the chain of causality is the effect of one object on another. It could be argued that the subject's realization of the Idea as non-individuated subject is an act of spontaneous transcendence, but even Schopenhauer ironically puts this realization beyond the province of certain, scientific knowledge. And all knowledge that is certain is expressible in words, as certain knowledge is governed under the principle of sufficient reason and thus able to be abstracted into a concept, according to Schopenhauer's own terms. Hence, what we find we cannot talk about and what we find to be uncertain is not adequate ground for scientific dialog. Philosophical dialog, on the other hand, is concerned with the how and why, and Schopenhauer, for his part, seems more focused on the why, and does consider discussions of realization of the Idea as within the province of philosophy, as it should be, even if not certain as he defines things to be certain. Now as for the Platonic Ideas, I have rendered them irrelevant to the current discussion. The question of the spontaneity of the realization of the Idea is therefore moot, as I

want to speak strictly about spontaneity and existence within the specific consideration of time proposed in the diagram. Therefore, I shall discuss the philosophical significance of the proposition, a specific but very significant aspect of Schopenhauer's whole system, and representative of the uniqueness of the core of his whole philosophy.

What this original proposal attempts to show is that, while time and causality are never-ending, every event, motive, or particular objectification is transient, and comes to pass with no more significance to the subject's real existence than any other. As Schopenhauer says, "What was? That which is. What will be? That which was." Even if the subject's body is destroyed, since his real existence is only in the present, any moment after his destruction is of no importance to him. Furthermore, while motives are possible by the subject representing objects to himself within the form of time as past and future, the subject's representation of motives and his being are objectifications of the will to live which always stay in the present.

We ask: how can any moment in time be indivisible? While Schopenhauer has not devised an answer to this question, I propose one. The answer is that time as a criterion for the existence of the subject is not really temporal, but mental. The subject's perspective in the world is relative to what the subject perceives as past and future; his mental representation of it. The subject's existence as body is representational, and Schopenhauer says that causal understanding is immediate, and this means that it is relative to the subject's perspective, happening not in the past or future, but immediately in what we can only describe as the present. This does not mean that time is an accidental form where past, present, and future bend to the whims of the subject; rather, it is still a necessary form of sensibility and causality, but in terms of it as criterion of existence of the subject, it is a form which is both necessary and relative to the way in which the mind works. Hence, as the subject represents causality to himself immediately, as far as he

understands time in terms of his own present existence, relative to the past and future, he understands it only in terms of his existing in the immutable present. In other words, time, as conceived as applying to existence and the individual subject representing things to himself immediately, is no longer infinitely divisible, as the subject's own perception cannot divide his present existence.

Schopenhauer's proposal makes man's existence and his interaction with the world out as something ethereal and transient. Merely a representation in the present, this moment being nothing but the indivisible point of view of the subject relative between past and future, the subject is not presumed to have much of a real, meaningful, or significant role in the world. On the other hand, everything, every object is always and forever relative and dependant upon him and him alone; so in this sense he is the most significant existence in the world. Yet this is and remains *his* world; the world of the subject. This presentation of reality reminds us of a dream where objects seem real and assured, but their actual nature is something we imagine out of our mind. That there are certain rules under which the mind operates is a reasonable enough proposal, as is Schopenhauer's idea of the principle of sufficient reason. But that objects and motives, while considered in the existential context of time are necessary, and at the same time essentially insignificant, transient, and always coming into and passing from existence is a proposal that has a sort of dreamy sleepiness about it.⁸¹

This philosophical outlook affords us an excellent insight into the phenomenological standpoint; while not always understood, this standpoint stands firm in one respect, but dreamy in another- and I do not mean this in disparaging terms, since the phenomenological standpoint

⁸¹ By "existential context of time," I mean time as consisting of past, present and future, as presented in the diagram. Time thus becomes an existential criterion in that it establishes a medium within which the present subject can exist relative to past and future. This existential context of time is to be distinguished from the phenomenal context of time, which uses time as the a priori form and criterion for the possibility of all experience.

seems so necessarily reasoned for. Yet the unmistakably original quality of this system's expression of the standpoint almost leaves us with a proposal that has at its core a profound near mysticism.

Nonetheless, these specific aspects of his system, which we have discussed at length, have afforded us a fresh, original, and defying perspective on western thinking and existence. That the final nature of the system, and its implied significance turns out to be a bit strange I do not hold as a reason to discount the thinking itself. What I hope to have accomplished, both thoroughly and clearly, is that first, the phenomenological standpoint itself should have been expounded to a limited extent here and more extensively earlier, in my essay on Schopenhauer's early will. By means of Schopenhauer's unique, systematic expression of the standpoint, I hope to have shown and convinced the reader that his philosophy is viable in its own right. Second, I want to have explained that Schopenhauer shows how reason and logic can be used in useful and needed ways in everyday life, even if the nature of this activity is disputable to some. Third, it should be clear how Schopenhauer's consideration and proposal of time can be considered in an existential context, and how this context provides us an insight into the double significance of its expression of the phenomenological standpoint. In closing, I would like to say that Schopenhauer's philosophy is much more than transitional, much more than "Kantian," as some may say, and that in addition, Schopenhauer takes momentous steps both from his contemporary influences and into his own unique, sophisticated manner of thinking about the world.

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