Supervenience and necessity: A response to Balaguer
History and Philosophy
In Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Mark Balaguer attempts to show that there is (1) one and only one defensible version of platonism, (2) one and only one defensible version of anti-platonism, and (3) no fact of the matter as to which is true. His arguments depend essentially on the notion of supervenience, yet he rejects metaphysical necessity. I argue that he cannot use logical, conceptual, or nomological necessity to explicate supervenience. Balaguer must either give up the arguments that make use of supervenience or accept metaphysical necessity. I also consider and reject a possible response to my arguments.
Link to Published Version
Dieterle, J. M. (2000). Supervenience and necessity: A response to Balaguer. Philosophia Mathematica, 8(3), 302–309. doi:10.1093/philmat/8.3.302