Business operations, contestability, bureaucratic holdup, and bribe solicitations
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2020
Department/School
Economics
Publication Title
Review of Development Economics
Abstract
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Adding to the literature on factors driving corruption and bribery, this paper examines the effect of contestability in business operations on bribe solicitations. Contestability undermines the bureaucratic rent-seeking potential, whereas bureaucratic holdup increases it. This paper tries to capture these influences empirically using cross-country survey data. The results show that the relatively greater contestability of business startup procedures compared to startup regulatory times led to fewer bribe demands; however, property registration regulations with lower relative contestability led to more bribe demands, especially for import licenses. We find relatively greater support for bureaucratic holdup (i.e., time taken by bureaucratic clearances) in startup procedures than with import licenses. Finally, older and larger firms received lower bribe demands, ceteris paribus.
Link to Published Version
Recommended Citation
Goel, R. K., Mazhar, U., & Saunoris, J. W. (2020). Business operations, contestability, bureaucratic holdup, and bribe solicitations. Review of Development Economics, 24(4), 1484–1510. https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12687