Axiomatizations of fuzzy cores in NTU fuzzy games and coalition production economies

Authors

• Jiuqiang Liu, Eastern Michigan University
• Rong Zou, Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, China
• Zingjun Luo, Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, China
• Wenna Want, Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, China
• Bo Duan, Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, China

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Department/School

Mathematics

Publication Title

Fuzzy Sets and Systems

Abstract

In this paper, we establish axiomatizations for cores and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies. In doing so, we provide an axiomatization for strong fuzzy cores in NTU fuzzy games, and prove that a non-transferable utility (NTU) fuzzy game can be generated by a coalition production economy if and only if it is compactly generated which generalizes the corresponding theorem by Inoue [Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (2013): 141–149]. As a consequence, we derive an axiomatization for strong cores in NTU games.

Comments

J. Liu is a faculty member in EMU's Department of Mathematics and Statistics.

Link to Published Version

DOI: 10.1016/j.fss.2026.109871

Recommended Citation

Liu, J., Zou, R., Luo, Q., Wang, W., & Duan, B. (2026). Axiomatizations of fuzzy cores in NTU fuzzy games and coalition production economies. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 535, 109871. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2026.109871