Date Approved
3-14-2013
Date Posted
5-31-2013
Degree Type
Open Access Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department or School
History and Philosophy
Committee Member
Jesse Kauffman, Ph.D., Chair
Committee Member
John Knight, Ph.D.
Committee Member
George Cassar, Ph.D.
Abstract
The Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War in October 1914 represents a break in over a century of diplomacy in the Middle East. Previous study of late Ottoman politics has focused more upon the European states with imperial interests in the Middle East and has not adequately explained why the weak Ottoman state decided to enter the war. This study utilizes both British and German diplomatic documents, along with published secondary works, to reframe the Ottoman entry into the war in a way that highlights Ottoman agency and illuminates the internal and external constraints faced by Ottoman statesmen. The study concludes that the Ottoman Empire entered the war on terms dictated by Istanbul and did so only because Britain, France, and Russia pursued a policy of active hostility to Ottoman interests.
Recommended Citation
Penix, Matthew David, "The Ottoman Empire in the first world war: A rational disaster" (2013). Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations. 465.
https://commons.emich.edu/theses/465